Carline Vilbon appeals from a judgment of the county court dismissing as moot her appeal under G. L. c. 112, § 64, from an order of the Board of Registration in Nursing (board) indefinitely suspending her nursing license. The grounds for the suspension were that Vilbon had not satisfied the educational requirements for licensure in Massachusetts and that she had engaged in deceptive conduct to obtain a license. While the matter was pending before the single justice, the board reconsidered and withdrew its finding that Vilbon had engaged in deceptive conduct, acknowledging that it had erred in making this finding. In addition, Vilbon remedied the deficiencies in her education. The board therefore reinstated her license. Vilbon now argues that, despite the reinstatement of her license, she has suffered further harm for which the board should compensate her and that sanctions should be imposed on the executive director of the board. However, under the "plain and unambiguous language of G. L. c. 112, § 64," Hoffer v. Board of Reg. in Medicine, 461 Mass. 451, 456 (2012), our authority is limited to "revising or reversing the decision of the board" suspending her license. The statute does not provide for any further relief. As Vilbon has received all the relief that is available under G. L. c. 112, § 64, the single justice properly dismissed the matter as moot. See Padmanabhan v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 476 Mass. 1018, 1019 (2017), citing Rasten v. Northeastern Univ., 432 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2000).

Judgment affirmed.

Carline Vilbon, pro se.

Carrie Benedon, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

The petitioner appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

The respondent sought an abuse prevention order against the petitioner pursuant to G. L. c. 209A. After a hearing on the extension of the temporary ex parte order, a judge in the District Court declined to extend the G. L. c. 209A order and instead issued a one-year harassment prevention order pursuant to G. L. c. 258E. The judge subsequently denied the petitioner's motion to reconsider, and the petitioner then filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the county court. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing.

The petitioner has now filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), but he is not challenging an interlocutory ruling of the trial court. Regardless of whether rule 2:21 applies, however, it is clear that the petitioner is not entitled to review pursuant to G. L.

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c. 211, § 3, because he has an adequate alternative remedy. See O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 417-418 (2012) (appeals from G. L. c. 258E harassment prevention orders to be filed in Appeals Court). The petitioner argues that the normal appellate process would be inadequate because of the time it would take to pursue the appeal and receive a favorable outcome. The remedy for this concern is to seek expedited review in the Appeals Court, a stay of the underlying order pending appeal, or both, not through a G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in this court.

The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

A.F., pro se.