The petitioner, Ricardo Barbosa, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court dismissing his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

At the time Barbosa filed his petition, he stood indicted on charges of rape and of being a habitual offender. He argued that at an April 2016 hearing in the Superior Court, he had been "disallowed" to change his plea. According to Barbosa, the Commonwealth had offered him a "four year sentence," but then "reneged" and raised the offer to a sentence of from five to seven years. Barbosa ultimately did not change his previously entered plea of not guilty. He filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in April 2016 asking this court to "allow" him to plead guilty in exchange for a four-year sentence. Meanwhile, while his petition was pending before the single justice, Barbosa was also pursuing an appeal to the full court from an earlier G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, filed in September 2014, which had also been denied by a single justice. In the course of that appeal, both in papers filed with the court and at oral argument, Barbosa had raised the same issue that he raised in his April 2016 petition. On that basis, the single justice dismissed the April 2016 petition.

Barbosa filed a timely notice of appeal from that dismissal and, with leave of court, received an extension of time to file his brief. By the time he filed his brief, however, he had already been tried and convicted on the rape charge, and shortly thereafter he was tried and convicted on the charge of being a habitual criminal. Because of the intervening trials and convictions, the G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition is now moot. Barbosa may of course present the issue raised in the petition  the Commonwealth's alleged failure to honor a plea deal -- in his direct appeal from his convictions. That appeal is pending, awaiting assembly of the record. For reasons explained in Barbosa v. Commonwealth (No. 2), 481 Mass. (2018), also decided today, we have directed that that appeal be entered directly in this court once the record is assembled.

Judgment affirmed.

Ricardo Barbosa, pro se.

Michael McGee, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

The petitioner, Ricardo Barbosa, was convicted by a Superior Court jury of rape, pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b), and, in a separate proceeding, of being a habitual offender pursuant to G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b). Shortly after he was convicted, he filed, in the county court, both a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and an application for "direct appellate review" purportedly under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. In both the petition and the application, Barbosa raised issues related to the habitual offender conviction. He argues, for example and among other things, that he has not been "convicted [two] times previously" of any of the crimes enumerated in the statute and that, more generally, the statute imposes unfair and unconstitutional sentencing requirements. A single justice denied both the petition and the application without a hearing, and Barbosa appeals. [Note 1]

Neither the petition nor the application is the proper means for Barbosa to get the review that he seeks of his conviction. As to the G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, the issues raised are ones for which Barbosa has an adequate alternative remedy -- he can raise them in a direct appeal. "Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is properly denied where there are adequate and effective routes other than c. 211, § 3, by which the petitioning party may seek relief." Greco v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019 (1996).

As to the G. L. c. 278, § 33E, application, as best we can discern from his materials it appears that Barbosa filed the application in the county court because he interprets that statute, as amended in 2012, see St. 2012, c. 192, §§ 43, 44, to require appeals from habitual offender convictions pursuant to G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), to be entered directly in this court and heard by this court in the first instance. Even if that were correct -- and we express no view on whether it is, as further explained below -- the process for the direct appeal is not through an application with the single justice, but rather through the eventual entry of the appeal directly in the full court once the record has been assembled in the trial court. The single justice, therefore, did not err in denying both the petition and the application.

Having said this, we recognize that there is an open question whether a direct appeal from a conviction pursuant to G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), should be entered in the Appeals Court or in the Supreme Judicial Court in the first instance. That particular question is not before us in this case, but rather is a question to be decided in Barbosa's direct appeal. As to that appeal, the trial court docket indicates that he has already filed timely notices of appeal in the trial court, [Note 2] and the record for that appeal is in the process of being assembled by the trial court

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clerk. In order to avoid any further confusion, and without prejudging the answer to the question, we direct the clerk of this court to inform the trial court clerk that, once the record in Barbosa's direct appeal is assembled, notice of the assembly, the docket entries, and the transcript are to be transmitted directly to this court, and the case shall be entered directly here. We will therein consider -- in addition to the substantive legal issues raised by Barbosa as to his convictions -- the procedural question whether, in future cases, direct appeals from habitual offender convictions pursuant to G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), must be entered directly in this court or whether, instead, such appeals shall be entered in the Appeals Court in the first instance. See G. L. c. 211A, § 10 (giving Appeals Court concurrent jurisdiction over all criminal appeals except appeals from convictions of murder in the first degree).

The judgment of the single justice denying Barbosa's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, and his G. L. c. 278, § 33E, application is affirmed.

So ordered.

Ricardo Barbosa, pro se.

Michael McGee, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.