The petitioner, Jian Jiang, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

The petitioner and the respondent, Qilun Liu, are married but in the midst of divorce proceedings in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department. Those proceedings involve, among other things, custody issues related to the parties' minor child. In his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, the petitioner sought relief from various interlocutory rulings of the probate judge, including, among other things, a temporary order relevant to the petitioner's parenting time, a temporary order requiring the petitioner to pay child support, and a temporary order allowing the respondent to travel to China in November 2018 with the parties' child. The petitioner also sought to have the probate judge recused. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing.

The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a showing that "review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2). The petitioner has not made, and cannot make, such a showing. In fact, he has not even addressed the point, focusing instead on the substantive merits of his claims. Regardless, there is no reason why the petitioner could not have sought interlocutory review of the judge's rulings under G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par. See Greco v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019-1020 (1996) ("Review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, does not lie where review under c. 231, § 118, would suffice"). Additionally, as to the denial of the petitioner's motion to recuse, there is no reason why the denial of any such motion could not be adequately addressed in a direct appeal from any adverse judgment. See Bloise v. Bloise, 437 Mass. 1010, 1010 (2002), citing Doten v. Plymouth Div. of the Probate & Family Court Dep't, 395 Mass. 1001 (1985).

The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

Jian Jiang, pro se.

Qilun Liu, pro se.

The petitioner, James Peter Kyricopoulos, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

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A jury convicted Kyricopoulos in 2014 of numerous counts of larceny over $250 in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 33. He filed a timely notice of appeal. As best we can tell from the record, including the trial court docket, there was some delay in the preparation of the relevant trial transcripts and the assembly of the record, leading eventually to Kyricopoulos's filing of a document with a single justice of the Appeals Court that was treated as a motion to compel assembly of the record and allowed. [Note 2] The record was subsequently assembled, and Kyricopoulos's direct appeal was entered in the Appeals Court in July 2016. After several stays, at Kyricopoulos's request, the appeal was ultimately dismissed for lack of prosecution in June 2017. [Note 3]

Kyricopoulos filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, in June 2018, in which, among other things, he sought to have his convictions vacated and the indictments dismissed, to be released immediately from prison, and to have certain evidence destroyed. He also asked the court to commence investigations into various individuals associated with his case, including the prosecutor, a judge, and the Attorney General. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing, and then subsequently denied Kyricopoulos's motions for reconsideration.

Kyricopoulus has now filed what appears to have been intended as a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). Technically speaking, rule 2:21 does not apply in this situation because Kyricopoulos is not challenging any interlocutory ruling of the trial court. It is nonetheless clear that he is not entitled to review pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. He continues to raise issues related to the delay in the assembly of the record in the trial court. To the extent that the record was assembled and Kyricopoulos's direct appeal was properly entered in the Appeals Court, the issue is moot. To the extent that Kyricopoulos claims that, in connection with the delay in the assembly of the record, members of the bar and the judiciary falsified docket entries, committed perjury, or otherwise sought to deprive Kyricopoulos of his rights, his arguments are neither adequate appellate argument nor substantiated by the record. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975). See also Gorod v. Tabachnick, 428 Mass. 1001, 1001, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998), and cases cited. [Note 4]

The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

James Peter Kyricopoulos, pro se.