Karol E. Simonton appeals from a judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In 1999, Simonton pleaded guilty to rape and other offenses and was sentenced to the State prison. In 2018, he filed his petition, in which he alleged that he was denied a speedy trial, that the indictments were known by the judge to be fatally defective, that the judge failed to examine whether the Superior Court had competent jurisdiction over the case and over Simonton, and that his plea was coerced. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, however, must be based on "grounds distinct from the issues at the indictment, trial, conviction, or sentencing stage." See, e.g., Soura, petitioner, 436 Mass. 1003, 1003-1004 (2002); Averett, petitioner, 404 Mass. 28, 30 (1989). See also G. L. c. 248, § 25 ("court shall have no power to issue a writ of habeas corpus, at its discretion for . . . a person who is imprisoned . . . pursuant to a criminal conviction"). As all of Simonton's claims "center[] on the criminal proceedings against him," they are inappropriate for habeas corpus relief. Aldrich, petitioner, 459 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2011). Rather, a motion for a new trial in the Superior Court pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), is the proper vehicle for raising such claims. Aldrich, petitioner, supra. The single justice correctly denied habeas corpus relief for these reasons.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on briefs.

Karol E. Simonton, pro se.

Matthew P. Landry, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent.

The petitioner, Neil Anderson, appeals from the judgment of a single justice of this court denying, without a hearing, his petition for extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and from the single justice's order denying his motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

In the petition, Anderson claimed that a Superior Court judge who presided in a criminal case against him had engaged in judicial misconduct -- specifically, that the judge forged certain documents to assist the prosecution. The single justice correctly denied relief because Anderson, who pleaded guilty to several charges in the criminal case, and who had not filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his pleas, "failed to show he lacked an adequate alternative to relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3." Watson v. Appeals Court, 456 Mass. 1027, 1027 (2010), citing Votta v. Police Dep't of Billerica, 444 Mass. 1001, 1001 (2005) (exercise of extraordinary superintendence power not "a substitute for the normal appellate process or merely to provide an additional layer of appellate

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review after the normal process has run its course"). [Note 1] Moreover, Anderson has "failed to provide any measure of record support for his claims of judicial misconduct." Watson, supra, citing Fogarty v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 103, 106–107 (1989) ("Clearly . . . an unsupported charge of . . . judicial misconduct fail[s] to demonstrate a substantial claim . . . necessary to justify the extraordinary relief of G. L. c. 211, § 3" [quotation omitted]). There was no error of law or abuse of discretion by the single justice.

Judgment affirmed.

Neil Anderson, pro se.

Mary O'Neil, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.