Home CURTIS HOWELL vs. COMMONWEALTH.

483 Mass. 1030

January 10, 2020

SJC-12775

Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Due Process of Law, Competency to stand trial.

The petitioner, Curtis Howell, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

Howell has been charged in a complaint with assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b). At the arraignment in the District Court, a judge ordered that Howell be committed to Bridgewater State Hospital pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a), for a determination whether he was competent to stand trial. The hospital subsequently filed a petition for civil commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b). After Howell had been committed for the initial competency determination, he filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the county court alleging various violations of his due process rights, the details of which are not easily discernable from the record before us. He subsequently filed additional papers in the county court raising issues related not to the underlying criminal proceedings but to the competency proceedings. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing.

In his appeal to this court, Howell argues that his substantive and due process rights have been violated and his right to a fair hearing (related, presumably, to the competency determination) and a fair trial (related, presumably, to the underlying criminal proceedings) have been hindered. What he has not done is demonstrate why he is entitled to review pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. Indeed, he has not even addressed the issue. It is in any event clear that he is not entitled to such review where other relief is available to him. There is no reason why his claims of violations of his due process rights cannot adequately be addressed in an appeal from any adverse judgment against him in the criminal proceedings or why his claims stemming from the competency proceedings cannot adequately be addressed in an appeal from a determination in that proceeding.

The single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

Curtis Howell, pro se.

Home KYL V. MYRICK vs. SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT.

483 Mass. 1030

January 10, 2020

SJC-12802

Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Mandamus. Practice, Civil, Assembly of record, Action in nature of mandamus.

Kyl V. Myrick appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition for relief in the nature of mandamus. Specifically, Myrick

Page 1031

sought an order requiring the Superior Court clerk to assemble the record for his appeal in his underlying civil action against Harvard University. We affirm.

Shortly after his appeal was entered in this court, Myrick filed a "memorandum appealing denial" of the single justice's judgment, in an apparent attempt to comply with S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). That rule applies to cases in which a single justice of this court "denies relief from an interlocutory ruling in the trial court." S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (1). The rule is inapplicable here, where there is no interlocutory order of the Superior Court at issue. Nonetheless, it is apparent from Myrick's submission and from the record below that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying relief.

As we have frequently observed -- including in another recent appeal by Myrick from a single justice's denial of mandamus relief -- "[i]t would be hard to find any principle more fully established in our practice than the principle that neither mandamus nor certiorari is to be used as a substitute for ordinary appellate procedure or used at any time when there is another adequate remedy." Myrick v. Superior Court Dep't, 479 Mass. 1012, 1012 (2018), quoting Rines v. Justices of the Superior Court, 330 Mass. 368, 371 (1953).

Where a litigant is experiencing delay in the assembly of a record, we have identified several practical and legal steps that are available to prompt action by the trial court, short of seeking extraordinary relief in this court. See Skandha v. Clerk of Superior Court for Civil Business in Suffolk County, 472 Mass. 1017, 1018 (2015), quoting Zatsky v. Zatsky, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 7, 12-13 (1994). From the record before us, it appears that Myrick has not availed himself of these. [Note 1] Here, as we have previously done, we conclude that the single justice was well within his discretion in denying relief where the record does not demonstrate that these alternative avenues of relief were unavailable. Skandha, supra at 1018.

That said, based on our review of the Superior Court docket, the materials that are before us, and the material that was before the single justice, it appears that the record in connection with Myrick's appeal from the November 7, 2018, judgment has yet to be assembled. To the extent there is some problem that prevents the clerk from assembling the record, the clerk should identify it for Myrick and, as appropriate, work with him to resolve it; if there is no problem, we trust that the record will be assembled forthwith.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

Kyl V. Myrick, pro se.


FOOTNOTES

[Note 1] Myrick appears to have raised the issue of the delay in the assembly of the record in a "motion for a new trial as a matter of law," filed in the Superior Court. However, the only relief requested in that motion was a new trial, not the actual assembly of the record.