Jorge Sanchez appeals from a judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

Sanchez was charged in the District Court with rape and other offenses. At his bail hearing, he requested a probable cause hearing on the ground that rape is an offense outside the District Court's jurisdiction. See G. L. c. 276, § 38; Commonwealth v. Perkins, 464 Mass. 92, 98, 103 (2013) (statute "provides for a probable cause hearing in cases where a defendant is charged with a crime in the District Court that lies beyond the jurisdiction of that court and for which the defendant is entitled to be proceeded against by indictment"; "probable cause hearing is to be held as soon as reasonably practicable in the circumstances presented"). His request was denied. Instead, a pretrial conference was scheduled. Sanchez's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition sought relief from the denial of a probable cause hearing. After the single justice denied relief, the defendant again requested, and was granted, a probable cause hearing date. [Note 1] Sanchez has thus received the specific relief he was seeking in his petition, rendering this appeal moot. See Santiago v. Young, 446 Mass. 1006, 1006 (2006).

Appeal dismissed.

Thomas Combs & Korrina Burnham, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Jorge Sanchez.

Aimee Rose Maldonado, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Imre Kifor appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his complaint for relief in the nature of certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4. We affirm.

Through this action in the nature of certiorari, Kifor sought to correct alleged errors in judicial proceedings in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department and in the Appeals Court. The single justice denied relief "on the grounds that [Kifor] has an adequate, alternate remedy in the normal appellate process." Kifor timely appealed.

After his appeal was entered in this court, Kifor filed an "SJC Rule 2:21 Memorandum" in an attempt to comply with S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). That rule applies when a single justice of this court "denies relief from an interlocutory ruling in the trial court." Id. Regardless of whether the rule applies to all of Kifor's claims, it is apparent from Kifor's submissions and from the record below that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying relief.

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"The purpose of a civil action in the nature of certiorari is to correct errors that 'are not otherwise reviewable by motion or by appeal.'" Johnson v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 1006, 1007 (2012), quoting G. L. c. 249, § 4. Kifor "bears the burden to allege and demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of other remedies." Kim v. Rosenthal, 473 Mass. 1029, 1030 (2016). He has not carried that burden here.

Kifor concedes that other appellate remedies are available to him, by acknowledging that, despite some delay, his appeals from various decisions and orders of the Probate and Family Court are now docketed and pending in the Appeals Court. Kifor's blanket assertions that such review will be inadequate are insufficient to demonstrate that he is entitled to review pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4.

Kifor has also availed himself of the procedures set forth in G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., to obtain review of certain interlocutory orders by a single justice of the Appeals Court. Where an Appeals Court single justice has denied relief under that statute, Kifor "is not entitled as of right to any further interlocutory review." Padmanabhan v. Cooke, 483 Mass. 1024, 1025 (2019).

The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief under G. L. c. 249, § 4.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

Imre Kifor, pro se.