The petitioner, Rian Waters, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court dismissing as moot his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

Waters commenced an action against the respondent, Aidan Kearney, and several other parties in the trial court in May 2018, alleging claims of, among other things, libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. After various proceedings in both the trial court and the Appeals Court, the only remaining claim was one of libel against Kearney. In August 2022, shortly before a scheduled pretrial conference in the trial court, Waters filed his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in which he asked the court to sanction Kearney (by "reaching and applying" Kearney's "ghost company's" assets); detain Kearney for criminal contempt (until he transfers his assets to Waters); and to hold an evidentiary hearing, order the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing, or appoint a "private prosecutor" to investigate obstruction. While the petition was pending, a judge in the trial court dismissed without prejudice the underlying case for failure to prosecute. On that basis, the single justice then dismissed Waters's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition as moot.

Waters has now filed what appears to have been intended as a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). Technically speaking, rule 2:21 does not apply in this situation because Waters is not challenging any interlocutory rulings of the trial court. It is nonetheless clear that he is not entitled to relief in this court. Waters argues, in his memorandum, that the case is not moot on the basis that -- his argument seems to be -- he has appealed from the dismissal of the case in the trial court. Where the issues that Waters raised in his petition relate specifically to that underlying case, however, the dismissal of that case consequentially renders those issues moot, regardless of whether Waters appeals from the judgment of dismissal. If Waters believes that the issues raised in his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition relate in any way to the trial court's decision to dismiss the case, he is free to raise those issues in his appeal from that dismissal. The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in dismissing the G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition on the basis that it was moot. [Note 1]

Judgment affirmed.

The petitioner, Edmond Carriere, appeals from a judgment of a single justice

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of this court denying his petition for extraordinary relief. [Note 1] We dismiss the appeal as moot.

Carriere is currently incarcerated at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Norfolk, serving a life sentence after being convicted of murder in the first degree. In March 2022, he filed a petition for medical parole. While that petition was still pending, he filed his petition for extraordinary relief in the county court in May 2022. In the latter petition, he asked the court to order the respondent, the Department of Correction (department), to create a medical parole plan, including having Carriere evaluated for placement in a specific institution. He also asked the court to report a question to the full court related to the department's responsibilities in connection with medical parole petitions. A single justice denied the petition without a hearing on the basis that Carriere has an adequate alternative remedy -- that is, that if the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner) denied medical parole, Carriere could seek review of the decision pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4. The commissioner has now denied the petition, and on that basis, we dismiss Carriere's appeal as moot. [Note 2]

We recently addressed, in essentially the same circumstances involving medical parole, the issues of both mootness and the propriety of mandamus relief in Troila v. Department of Correction, 490 Mass. 1013 (2022). There, as here, the petitioner had filed a petition for medical parole and, while the petition was pending, sought extraordinary relief in the county court. See id. at 1013-1014. Also in that case, like the circumstances here, the commissioner denied Troila's petition for medical parole and a single justice denied his petition for extraordinary relief. See id. at 1014. As we stated in Troila, where the "petition for medical parole has been denied, the question of preparing a medical parole plan for [the petitioner] is moot, as is any legal question concerning the department's obligations with regard to medical parole planning." Id.

Furthermore, as in Troila, 490 Mass. at 1014, the petitioner here would fare no better even were we to consider the merits. A single justice's decision denying relief in the nature of mandamus "will rarely be overturned." Id., and cases cited. Relief in the nature of mandamus is not to be "used as a substitute for ordinary appellate procedure or used at any time when there is another adequate remedy." Id., and cases cited. There is no indication in the record before us whether Carriere is challenging the denial of medical parole, as he is entitled to do pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, but even if the appeal were not moot, that is where his remedy would lie.

Appeal dismissed.

The case was submitted on briefs.

Ruth Greenberg for the petitioner.

Mary Eiro-Bartevyan for the respondent.