Orrett Daley appeals from a judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, on the ground that he has an adequate remedy in the normal appellate process. We affirm.

Daley has been charged in the District Court with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor and other offenses. He filed a motion for third-party records, specifically, personal telephone records of the State police trooper [Note 1] who conducted the motor vehicle stop that resulted in the charges. That motion was denied, as was a motion for reconsideration. Some months later, Daley filed a motion to impose sanctions on the Commonwealth for an alleged lack of compliance with a discovery order and a request for records based on new evidence. That motion and request were also denied. Daley's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition challenged these interlocutory rulings.

The case is before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2), as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires Daley to file a record appendix and memorandum "set[ting] forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." [Note 2] Daley cannot make this showing. The adverse rulings can be addressed on appeal if he is convicted of any offense. Daley asserts that he should not have to await conviction and appeal, but offers no reason why this ordinary process, applicable in any other case where a criminal defendant unsuccessfully moves for discovery, is inadequate in his case. The single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying relief.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

Michael A. McLaughlin for the petitioner.

The defendant, John T. Cappellucci, Jr., was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of both alcohol and drugs causing serious bodily injury (OUI-SBI) pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24L. A judge allowed the defendant's motion to suppress the analysis of his blood samples based on G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e) (§ 24 [1] [e]), which conditions the admissibility of a defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) in a prosecution for a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (i.e., "simple OUI") on the defendant's consent to conduct the analysis. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the defendant's blood test results are admissible because the consent requirement of § 24 (1) (e) applies only to the prosecution of simple OUI. We agree with the Commonwealth and therefore reverse.

1. Facts and prior proceedings. We summarize the undisputed facts from the pleadings. On December 9, 2021, the defendant was involved in a head-on automobile accident in Wayland. The driver of the other car told officers that the defendant had veered onto her side of the road causing the collision. The officers noted that the defendant's eyes appeared bloodshot and glassy and that he smelled of alcohol. The defendant was arrested on the scene, and both he and the other driver were transported to the hospital.

Although the defendant refused to consent to a test of his BAC, law enforcement officers applied for and obtained a search warrant for blood samples that had been taken in the ordinary course of treatment. The State police crime laboratory later determined that the defendant's BAC was .09 percent [Note 1] and that his blood tested positive for both fentanyl and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).

The defendant was charged with, among other offenses, two counts of OUI-SBI, the first under a theory of intoxication by alcohol, and the second under a theory of intoxication by drugs. See G. L. c. 90, § 24L (2). [Note 2] The defendant successfully moved to suppress the results of tests performed "at the direction of police" on blood samples drawn at the hospital, arguing that he did not consent to the analysis. See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e). The Commonwealth appealed to a single justice of this court, who allowed the Commonwealth's application for interlocutory appeal to proceed in this court.

2. Discussion. This case is governed in all material respects by our decision today in a companion case, Commonwealth v. Zucchino, 493 Mass. 747 (2024), where we concluded that the clear and unambiguous consent requirement in § 24 (1) (e) applies only to prosecutions for violations of simple OUI. [Note 3] Here, because the defendant has not been charged with a violation of § 24 (1) (a), the consent provision of § 24 (1) (e) does not come into play. The defendant's BAC test result thus is admissible subject to the ordinary rules of evidence.

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We reverse the grant of the motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

Melissa W. Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney (Daniel Bolcun, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.

Mark W. Helwig for the defendant.