PLYMOUTH COUNTY BUS TRANSPORTATION, INC. & others [Note 1] vs. GREATER NEW BEDFORD REGIONAL VOCATIONAL TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOL COMMITTEE & others. [Note 2]

GREANEY, J. At issue in this case is the validity of a regional school district committee's plan to transport large numbers of students to and from its high school by means of public transportation. The plaintiffs claim that the transportation plan violates G. L. c. 71, Sections 7A and 7C. We hold that the plan conforms to statutory requirements.

The plaintiffs brought this action in 1977 to challenge a decision by the Greater New Bedford Regional Vocational Technical High School Committee [Note 3] (committee) to use public rather than private bus services to transport approximately 1,000 New Bedford students to the regional district's new high school. The public bus service was supplied by the Southeastern Regional Transit Authority (SERTA) -- a regional transportation authority operating pursuant to G. L. c. 161B [Note 4] -- through its agent, the Union Street Railway Company (Union Street). The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the transportation plan violated G. L. c. 71,

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Sections 7A [Note 5] and 7C. [Note 6] They also sought injunctions to stop the plan from taking effect and to prevent the various State defendants

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from approving it or assisting SERTA financially. After a seventeen-day trial, a judge sitting in the Superior Court entered a memorandum of decision which held substantially in the defendants' favor. A judgment was subsequently entered which denied the requested injunctive relief and which declared, in essence, that the committee's actions complied in all respects with the requirements of the pertinent statutes.

The facts, taken principally from the judge's findings, may be summarized as follows. Some time prior to the fall of 1977, the committee began to discuss the transportation needs of the students who would attend the new regional high school opening that September. These discussions included the merits of using public as opposed to privately-contracted transportation for the students. In July, 1977, the committee solicited bids from private carriers for the transportation contract. In the bid invitation and the accompanying specifications, the committee reserved the right "to reject any or all bids or any part thereof."

Before the bid deadline, the committee received sealed bids from four private contractors and a proposal from Union Street on behalf of SERTA. Union Street's letter indicated that over ninety-five per cent of the New Bedford students lived within 1,500 feet of the existing SERTA bus route which directly or indirectly serviced the school. By adding buses on some routes and making minor modifications on others, SERTA buses could carry almost all of the students who needed transportation. It was proposed that the committee make bulk purchases of books containing "10-ride school tickets" which would be distributed to the students. Each ticket would be good for one zone of travel at the usual one-half student fare. A student would board a regular SERTA bus at the stop nearest his home and would use one or two tickets, depending on the distance (zones) from the bus stop to the school, in the same manner as regular passengers who were taking the bus. The proposal

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did not comply with at least five of the committee's published specifications. [Note 7]

After hearing representatives of the private carriers and Union Street, the committee voted on August 7, 1977, four to two, to award the transportation contract to one of the private bidders. Because of a rule that a majority of five votes was necessary to pass any matter before the committee, the motion was declared defeated. On August 9, 1977, the committee voted, five to three, to accept Union Street's proposal, to reject all the private bids, and to readvertise for new bids for the transportation of those students living in Fairhaven and Dartmouth as well as certain outlying sections of New Bedford who could not be accommodated on SERTA's routes. Transportation for these students was eventually arranged with one of the private companies. At the time of its votes, the committee had information from which it could find that the district would save money by using public transportation.

In September, 1977, the plan went into effect. Union Street added eleven buses from its existing stock to service certain routes. All the carriers traveled along regular public bus routes to the high school. In order to meet demand at peak times, the interval between buses on some of the routes was reduced from fifteen to ten minutes. In the afternoon, eleven buses were released from SERTA's garage and traveled directly to the high school with "out of service" signs on their rollers. These buses picked up the students at 2:30 P.M. and then proceeded to pick up and dispatch passengers along established routes within the city. There was evidence

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that nonstudent passengers were not denied access to the buses (although at peak times the majority of the passengers were students), that the buses were not modified in any respect to carry the students, [Note 8] and that the arrangements made were consistent with measures usually taken by SERTA to meet community needs. [Note 9]

1. We first address the plaintiffs' contention that the transportation plan is illegal because it violates that portion of G. L. c. 71, Section 7C (see note 6, supra) which denies financial assistance to public carriers who violate or breach a prescribed agreement by engaging in school bus operations, exclusively for the transportation of students. The plaintiffs argue that this statute was designed to promote free enterprise by keeping public transportation systems completely out of this market. These arguments overlook the existence of G. L. c. 71, Section 7B, as amended through St. 1978, c. 514, Section 188, [Note 10] the interrelation between Sections 7A, 7B, and 7C, and the judge's findings on the crucial issue whether this plan

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amounts to "school bus operations, exclusively for the transportation of students."

Since 1947, G. L. c. 71, Section 7A, has set forth the conditions and mechanisms for reimbursement of the costs spent by municipalities on contracts for the mandatory transportation of students to schools. See Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12, at 120 (1965); 1965 Ann. Survey Mass. Law Section 20.24, at 318. Beginning in 1961, unsuccessful legislative efforts were made to obtain additional reimbursement to municipalities for a greater portion of pupil transportation costs. See, e.g., 1962 Senate Doc. No. 899; 1964 Senate Doc. No. 806. In April, 1964, the Governor filed a special message with the Legislature with respect to the Commonwealth's transportation problems. Out of this message came 1964 Senate Doc. No. 925, which was engrossed and enacted on June 17, 1964, as St. 1964, c. 563. [Note 11] Section 8 of this chapter created Section 7B of c. 71, to reimburse municipalities for direct [Note 12] or indirect [Note 13] costs, not otherwise reimbursable under Section 7A, incurred in connection with pupil transportation by bus companies (licensed under G. L. c. 159A, Sections 1 and 7) or by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (under G. L. c. 161A). In 1973, Section 7B was amended (St. 1973, c. 1141, Section 5) to authorize reimbursement for transportation costs arising out of the use of regional transportation authorities established under G. L. c. 161B. Sections 7A and 7B provide special subsidies within the framework of the education law (see Rep. A. G., supra at 121) to assist municipalities

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in achieving the goal (stated in Section 7A) of "transport[ing] . . . pupils at the lowest cost commensurate with their safety."

Section 7C -- taken from a section of the 1973 Federal-Aid Highway Act [Note 14] -- was added to the statutory scheme in 1976. This statute is intended to protect the legitimate economic expectations of private school bus operators. It seeks as well to insure that public transportation companies will not forsake their basic priority of providing economical transportation for people living in urban areas for potentially more lucrative school bus contracts.

These three statutes must be construed in light of the foregoing legislative history and their respective objectives (Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513 [1975], and cases cited) under the settled principle that "[s]ections of the same chapter are to be interpreted, if reasonably practicable, so as to constitute an harmonious and consistent body of laws." Gosselin v. Gosselin, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 146, 148 (1973), citing Kelley v. Jordan Marsh Co., 278 Mass. 101, 111 (1932). See Morse v. Boston, 253 Mass. 247, 252 (1925); McCue v. Director of Civil Serv., 325 Mass. 605, 611 (1950). We do not view Section 7C as an attempt to nullify the ability of a municipality to obtain maximum reimbursement by making the most efficient use of available private and public facilities to transport its students. Rather, Section 7C bars public carriers (under threat of loss of certain financial assistance) from "engag[ing] in school bus operations, exclusively for the transportation of students . . . ." This restriction on public carriers indirectly limits a municipality in its choice of resources for pupil transportation.

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In this statutory context, the trial judge ruled that he was "unable to find that SERTA engaged in the transportation of students on routes especially established for the purpose of carrying students to the exclusion of others." [Note 15] He apparently accepted the evidence that, within the transportation industry, "school bus operations" involve "transportation by bus exclusively for school students . . . using [certain specific types of] school vehicles as defined in the Highway Safety Program . . ." (49 C.F.R. Section 605.3 [1976]), and he apparently construed the critical word "exclusively" in accordance with its approved usage (G. L. c. 4, Section 6, Third; Moy v. Jack Madden Ford Sales, Inc., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 102, 105 [1976]) to mean "in an exclusive manner," Webster's Third New Intl. Dictionary 793 (1976); [Note 16] Black's Law Dictionary 506, 507 (5th ed. 1979). See Chatham Corp. v. State Tax Commn., 362 Mass. 216, 219 (1972). We believe, with respect to school bus operations, that the word "exclusively," as used in Section 7C, denotes service which limits ridership only to student passengers on special routes under a closed door policy. The question whether the plan in this case amounted to exclusive school bus operations thus became one of fact for the judge to resolve under the relevant legal principles just discussed. The plaintiffs have not shown that the judge misconceived or misapplied these principles

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or that his findings on the determinative issue of exclusivity were clearly erroneous. [Note 17] Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a), 365 Mass. 816 (1974). United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Building Inspector of Lancaster v. Sanderson, 372 Mass. 157, 160-161 (1977), Smith & Zobel, Rules Practice Section 52.7 (1977). [Note 18] The conclusion

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that this aspect of the plan did not violate the transportation statutes was proper.

2. The plaintiffs next argue that the "award of a public school transportation contract in the absence of a sealed bid and in disrespect of specifications promulgated by the awarding authority violates . . . Section 7A." We disagree.

Section 7A is in essence a reimbursement statute which permits a municipality to recoup some or all of its pupil transportation expenses for a contract awarded to a private company "upon the basis of prevailing wage rates . . . and of sealed bids." The statute specifically provides that any expenses submitted for reimbursement are to be rejected if the Commissioner of Education determines that the expenses have been incurred for transportation which "is not authorized hereunder or has been incurred pursuant to any contract awarded in violation of any provision of this section . . ." (emphasis supplied).

Section 7B, on the other hand, authorizes reimbursement of "part of the cost not reimburseable under section seven A." This statute makes no provision for sealed bids or minimum wage rates, as required for reimbursement in Section 7A. The language in the two statutes is relatively straightforward -- as such it furnishes the primary source for their construction. We are satisfied that Section 7A is limited to contracts framed thereunder and that where a municipality resorts to public transportation under Section 7B to bus its pupils, the competitive bidding features of Section 7A do not apply as a condition precedent to engaging the public carrier or to obtaining reimbursement. It is also apparent from the record that Union Street made no attempt to bid on the contract, that the committee did not regard Union Street's submission as a bid, and that the committee would look only to Section 7B for reimbursement of the cost of Union Street's services. In the absence of a specific provision in Section 7B requiring that bidding procedures be followed, such procedures are not to be implied, but it is to be inferred that the contract (if one is involved) [Note 19] is to be left to the reasonable

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judgment of the municipal agency charged with responsibility therefor. See Archambault v. Mayor of Lowell, 278 Mass. 327, 332 (1932), and cases cited; 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations Section 29.31, at 328-329 (3d ed. 1966). Deary v. Dudley, 343 Mass. 192, 194 (1961). Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. School Comm. of Burlington, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 399, 402 (1975).

3. There is no merit to the argument that the committee's votes on August 2 and 9, 1977, were improper. The agreement establishing the school district and the committee's rules make it clear that the quorum for transaction of business shall be a majority of the committee and that no action shall carry unless it shall receive the vote of a majority of the committee's members. See Third Sch. Dist. in Stoughton v. Atherton, 12 Met. 105, 111-112 (1846). Likewise, the rejection of all the bids submitted under Section 7A was proper under the rights reserved by the committee to reject "any or all bids." See Deary v. Dudley, supra at 194; 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, supra Section 29.77. [Note 20]

Judgment affirmed.