Neither the findings by the board nor those by the judge concerning the prior commercial use to which the locus had been devoted and the condition of the building thereon since the discontinuance of that use were sufficient to warrant a conclusion that the variance complained of by the plaintiffs could be granted "without nullifying or substantially derogating from the intent or purpose of . . . [the zoning] ordinance" (G. L. c. 40A, Section 15[3], as amended through St. 1958, c. 381). See DiRico v. Board of Appeals of Quincy, 341 Mass. 607 , 609-610 (1961); Garfield v. Board of Appeals of Rockport, 356 Mass. 37 , 40 (1969); Hunt v. Milton Sav. Bank, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 133 , 135-141 (1974). An unsupported conclusion to that effect could not serve as a substitute for findings warranting such a conclusion. Wolfson v. Sun Oil Co. 357 Mass. 87 , 89 (1970). Raia v. Board of Appeals of No. Reading, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 318 , 322 (1976). Nor could this court appropriately supply such findings from the evidence presented in the Superior Court. Hunt v. Milton Sav. Bank, 2 Mass. App. Ct. at 140. The defendants had the burden of producing that evidence (Raia v. Board of Appeals of No. Reading, 4 Mass. App. Ct. at 321), and we are satisfied that it was inadequate to support such findings. On the contrary, virtually all of the evidence regarding the character of the neighborhood cut the other way. Compare DiRico v. Board of Appeals of Quincy, 341 Mass. at 610, and cases cited; Hunt v. Milton Sav. Bank, 2 Mass. App. Ct. at 140. Hence, the judgment upholding the grant of the variance was erroneous. Benjamin v. Board of Appeals of Swansea, 338 Mass. 257 , 262 (1959). Planning Bd. of Springfield v. Board of Appeals of Springfield, 355 Mass. 460 , 462 (1969). The judgment is reversed, and a new judgment is to be entered that the decision of the board of appeals was in excess of its authority and is annulled.

So ordered.

Even if we were to decide that the findings of the defendant board and those of the trial judge established the existence of a "hardship" within the meaning of G. L. c. 40A, Section 15, as amended through St. 1958, c. 381 (but see Sullivan v. Board of Appeals of Belmont, 346 Mass. 81 , 84-86 [1963]), neither the board nor the judge made findings sufficient to satisfy the requirement of that section that the variance could "be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without nullifying or substantially derogating from the intent or purpose of . . . [the zoning] by-law." The mere repetition of the statutory language did not fill that

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hiatus. Wolfson v. Sun Oil Co. 357 Mass. 87 , 89 (1970). Raia v. Board of Appeals of No. Reading, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 318 , 322 (1976). The finding by the board and the judge that the grant of the variance would have no significant impact on traffic conditions in the area, though relevant to the quoted requirement, was insufficient without more. Compare Planning Bd. of Springfield v. Board of Appeals of Springfield, 355 Mass. 460 , 462 (1969). The other factor relied upon by the judge, the proximity of the locus to a public library and to various commercial enterprises, was insignificant in light of the fact that the locus happens to be situated at the boundary between the residential zoning district in which it lies and a neighboring business district. The proximity of those uses is more appropriately a matter for consideration by the town under procedures for amending the by-law itself rather than by the board of appeals in granting variances thereunder. Coolidge v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Framingham, 343 Mass. 742 , 745-746 (1962), and cases cited. Missing is any finding as to the overall effect of the proposed use of the locus upon other property within the same district, a necessary element in determining whether the statutory standard has been met. See Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 324 Mass. 427 , 431 (1949); Everpure Ice Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Lawrence, 324 Mass. 433 , 438-439 (1949); Benjamin v. Board of Appeals of Swansea, 338 Mass. 257 , 261-262 (1959); DiRico v. Board of Appeals of Quincy, 341 Mass. 607 , 610-611 (1961). Compare Cary v. Board of Appeals of Worcester, 340 Mass. 748 , 751-753 (1960). Nor, bearing in mind that the defendants had the burden of producing evidence in support of the missing finding (Raia v. Board of Appeals of No. Reading, 4 Mass. App. Ct. at 321), can we supply that finding on the basis of the meager evidence before us relating to the effect of the proposed use. See Hunt v. Milton Sav. Bank, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 133 , 138-139 (1974). Compare Cass v. Board of Appeal of Fall River, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 555 , 558 (1974). It follows that the variance was improperly granted. The judgment is reversed, and a new judgment is to be entered that the decision of the board of appeals was in excess of its authority and is annulled.

So ordered.