This case is before us on a report (see Mass.R.Civ.P. 64, 365 Mass. 831 [1974]) by a judge of the Superior Court, who has made certain findings and rulings but has not yet ordered the entry of judgment. The only question which has been argued by the parties concerns the jurisdiction of the Superior Court. The action was commenced by two residents and taxpayers of Northampton to challenge and have set aside a conveyance by which the defendant county commissioners purported to transfer a parcel of land owned by the county to the defendant American Legion Post No. 28 Home, Inc., for a nominal consideration. We hold that the Superior Court has jurisdiction to entertain the action, not (as the plaintiffs contend) under the concurrent equity jurisdiction of that court granted by G. L. c. 214, Section 1, but under the statutory jurisdiction granted by G. L. c. 35, Section 35. Although Section 35 by its terms vests jurisdiction only in the Supreme Judicial Court, that jurisdiction may be exercised concurrently by the Superior Court under the provisions of G. L. c. 213, Section 1A. See Brooks v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 78 , 79 n.1 (1973). We decline to pass on the merits of the case prior to entry of judgment because the questions presented have not been briefed or argued by any party. It is our hope that, if the case returns to this court by way of an appeal from a final judgment, we shall have the benefit of somewhat more detailed factual development and an appendix that includes such papers as the pleadings and exhibits. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

So ordered.

The plaintiffs brought this action under G. L. c. 40A, Section 21, as amended through St. 1974, c. 78, Section 1, to annul the decision of the defendant board. Prior to trial the parties stipulated as to the issues before the Superior Court. The judgment must be reversed. The

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fact that the judge made detailed findings does not rectify a failure by the board to find each of the requirements for a variance and to set forth clearly the reason or reasons for its decision. Barnhart v. Board of Appeals of Scituate, 343 Mass. 455 , 456-457 (1962). Cass v. Board of Appeal of Fall River, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 555 , 558 n.5 (1974). See Planning Bd. of Springfield v. Board of Appeals of Springfield, 355 Mass. 460 , 462 (1969). The board's findings are "a mere repetition of the statutory words," Brackett v. Board of Appeal of the Bldg. Dept. of Boston, 311 Mass. 52 , 54 (1942), and are therefore inadequate to support the grant of a variance. Wolfson v. Sun Oil Co. 357 Mass. 87 , 89 (1970). Compare Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290 , 292-293 (1972). Neither the board's findings nor those of the judge establish the existence of substantial hardship "owing to conditions especially affecting [the parcel in question] but not affecting generally the zoning district in which it is located." G. L. c. 40A, Section 15, as amended through St. 1958, c. 381. Compare Barnhart v. Board of Appeals of Scituate, supra. The judgment is reversed, and a new judgment is to be entered that the decision of the board was in excess of its authority and is annulled.

So ordered.