IN THE MATTER OF S.E.

STARK, J. On December 26, 2019, representatives from McLean Hospital filed a petition for civil commitment against S.E. pursuant to G.L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. On January 2, 2020, after a full hearing, a District Court judge allowed the petition and ordered the respondent committed. The respondent, S.E., has appealed the commitment order based on her contention that, among others, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition because it was not signed by the superintendent of the facility. Because we find that the petition was not signed by the superintendent or any identified designee, the commitment and treatment orders are vacated.

The petition for commitment in this matter was submitted on a form promulgated by the trial court (as most are). On the form, there is a space at the top for the petitioner to enter their name, and another space to enter their title. The name "SCOTT RAUCH, M.D." is printed in the space for the petitioner's name. The title "Pres/Psychiatrist in Chief" is printed in the space for the petitioner's title. At the bottom of the form, there is a space for the petitioner to sign their name, to print their name, and to indicate their title. The petition was signed by "Dost Ongur, MD." That person indicated on the form that their title is "Director Schizophrenia & Bipolar Dis. Prg." [Note 1]

"Subject matter jurisdiction is 'jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought' . . . ." (Citation omitted.) The question at the heart of subject matter jurisdiction is, 'Has the Legislature empowered the [court] to hear cases of a certain genre?'" Ten Persons of Commonwealth v. Fellsway Dev., LLC, 460 Mass. 366, 375 (2011), quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3974 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 457 Mass. 53, 56-57 (2010). In other words, subject matter jurisdiction "is both conferred and limited by statute." Mendes's Case, 486 Mass. 139, 143 (2020).

Although subject matter jurisdiction was not raised in the trial court, the issue is not waived and may be raised for the first time on appeal. "Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, conduct or waiver." Harker v. City of Holyoke, 390 Mass. 555, 559 (1983), quoting Litton Business Sys. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 383 Mass. 619, 622 (1981). Where a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the judgment is void and time limitations for raising the issue are inapplicable. ROPT Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431 Mass. 601, 605 (2000). See Adoption of Peggy, 436 Mass. 690, 696 (2002) (issues of subject matter jurisdiction are not waivable and may be raised at any time).

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General Laws c. 123 confers subject matter jurisdiction to the District Court to hear petitions for civil commitment. Specifically, § 7(a) of Chapter 123 provides as follows: "The superintendent of a facility may petition the district court or the division of the juvenile court department in whose jurisdiction the facility is located for the commitment to said facility and retention of any patient at said facility whom said superintendent determines that the failure to hospitalize would create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness." "Facility" is defined by G.L. c. 123, § 1 as a "public or private facility for the care and treatment of mentally ill persons, except for the Bridgewater State Hospital." The procedural provisions of Chapter 123 have been strictly construed due to the "massive curtailment" of liberty experienced by persons involuntarily committed. See, e.g., Newton-Wellesley Hosp. v. Magrini, 451 Mass. 777, 784 (2008); Acting Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 104-105 (2000).

Chapter 123 further provides that the Department of Mental Health ("Department") is to "adopt regulations consistent with [G.L. c. 123] which establish procedures and the highest practicable professional standards for the reception, examination, treatment, restraint, transfer and discharge of mentally ill persons in departmental facilities. Said regulations shall be adaptable to changing conditions and to advances in methods of care and treatment of the mentally ill." G.L. c. 123, § 2. Pursuant to this charge, the Department has promulgated regulations that set forth various definitions. "Superintendent" is defined in G.L. c. 123, § 1 as the "superintendent or other head of a public or private facility." The regulations contained in 104 Code Mass. Regs. § 25.02, and adopted by the Department pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 2, contain the following definition: "Facility Director or Director of a Facility. The superintendent, chief operating officer, or other head of a facility, who may petition the district or juvenile court for commitment pursuant to M.G.L. c. 123; and who may take such other action as is authorized or required of the superintendent pursuant to M.G.L. c. 123."

In BayRidge Hosp. v. Jackson, 2010 Mass. App. Div. 12, the Appellate Division held that a psychiatric unit of a hospital meets the definition of a "facility" and that the medical director of the psychiatric unit meets the definition of a "superintendent or other head of a public or private facility." Id. at 13-14. Additionally, in Matter of B.L., 2016 Mass. App. Div. 119, the Appellate Division held that because "the superintendent or other head of a facility is not always present and available" and because of the time frame in which petitions for commitment must be signed and filed, it is reasonable for the medical director to designate someone to act as a temporary head of the facility in the director's absence. Id. at 120. See also Matter of C.C., 2019 Mass. App. Div. 77.

In this case, the petitioner and the person who signed the petition are two different people. There was no evidence presented to the trial judge that the person who signed the petition had any designation at the hospital that would indicate they were the head of the facility. While Dr. Ongur's title is that of a program director, there is no further indication that such a title placed the doctor in charge of the facility. Because the signatory to the petition was not authorized to sign the petition for commitment, the District Court lacked jurisdiction. See Pembroke Hosp. v. D.L., 482 Mass. 346, 354 (2019) (holding that District Court did not have jurisdiction to rule on civil commitment petition because respondent was not lawfully held pursuant to statute). The commitment order and treatment order are vacated.