Home PETRELL LAND DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. COMMONWEALTH.

353 Mass. 752

November 29, 1967

The trial was for the assessment of damages under G. L. c. 79, Section 14, for the taking by the Commonwealth of part of the petitioner's land in Hanover and Norwell on January 25, 1960, in connection with the construction of the Southeast Expressway. All of the land taken, zoned principally for residence purposes, was vacant woodland. All of the exceptions relate to (a) the alleged lack of qualifications of the sole witness for the Commonwealth and (b) the method of evaluation used by him. From 1915 to 1945 the witness had been intermittently connected with the real estate business in areas away from the locus. Since 1945 he had specialized in real estate appraisals for the Commonwealth and for a public utility between Kingston and Duxbury and between Kingston and East Bridgewater, respectively. He had testified as an expert on these properties in three counties including the forum of the trial. Although concrete examples of familiarity with transactions dealing with comparable land would have been desirable, the admission of his testimony does not require reversal. Rubin v. Arlington, 327 Mass. 382 , 384-385. George v. Commonwealth, 348 Mass. 780 . Since the land taken was divisible into categories which were uniform in their characteristics, the evaluation of one lot in each category multiplied by the number of similar lots was not error as matter of law. Gazianis v. Clinton, 350 Mass. 758 , does not hold otherwise. The instructions of the judge placed both issues in proper perspective.

Exceptions overruled.

Home GENERAL SIGNAL CORPORATION vs. GENERAL RAILWAY SIGNAL COMPANY.

353 Mass. 752

November 30, 1967

The plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendant from using the name "General Signal Corporation" or "General Signal Company." The trial judge made findings of fact and ordered the entry of a decree dismissing the bill and reported the case. A transcript of the evidence and the exhibits are before us. The somewhat extensive findings of the judge show that the defendant is a New York corporation organized under the name of "General Railway Signal Company" in 1904 and registered in Massachusetts in 1946. It has been listed on the New York Stock Exchange since 1924. In 1963 it changed its name to "General Signal Corporation." The plaintiff is a Massachusetts corporation organized in 1945 under the name of "FiResearch Corporation." It was registered only in Massachusetts. "It did a small amount of business, mostly in Massachusetts, with some sales in other states. In January of 1956 it changed its name to General Signal Corporation." The defendant "operates throughout the United States and overseas through `various autonomous subsidiaries,' with total sales in 1964 in excess of $57,000,000. The plaintiff's total sales reached its highest point in 1964 to an amount of $63,486.50. The plaintiff's capital is relatively small." The

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judge concluded that the name "`General Signal Corporation' has not acquired a secondary meaning in the industry as specifically indicating the plaintiff's products." Our review of the evidence and our examination of the exhibits satisfy us that the judge was right. Fulton v. Belmont, 333 Mass. 64 , 65. See Sears v. Sears, 344 Mass. 755 . A decree is to enter dismissing the bill.

So ordered.