PAUL S. CIARAMITARO [Note 1] vs. SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF SAUGUS & another; [Note 2] NORTHEAST METROPOLITAN REGIONAL VOCATIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, third-party defendant.

NOLAN, J. Northeast Metropolitan Regional Technical High School is an independent vocational school operated by the Northeast Metropolitan Regional Vocational School District (both hereinafter Northeast). Northeast serves twelve

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communities including Saugus, where the plaintiff, Paul Ciaramitaro, resides. In December of 1981 Ciaramitaro applied to Northeast for admission in the 1982-1983 school year. Ciaramitaro was denied admission to Northeast and was placed on the waiting list. He then applied to Minuteman Regional Vocational Technical School (Minuteman) and was admitted for the 1982-1983 school year. Saugus is not a member of the Minuteman school district. The Department of Education approved Ciaramitaro's admission to Minuteman and ordered the town of Saugus to pay the tuition and transportation costs involved with Ciaramitaro's attendance at Minuteman. Saugus refused. Ciaramitaro attended neither Northeast nor Minuteman in the fall of 1982. Instead, he attended a public junior high school in Saugus.

Ciaramitaro commenced this action against Saugus, seeking damages on the grounds that Saugus (1) unlawfully excluded him from the advantages and privileges of public schools in violation of G. L. c. 76, Section 16 (1988 ed.), and (2) violated his civil rights. Saugus filed a third-party complaint against Northeast. The Superior Court ruled that Saugus had violated G. L. c. 76, Section 16, but ruled against Ciaramitaro on the civil rights claim. [Note 3] The court dismissed Saugus's third-party complaint against Northeast. The Superior Court judge then reported three questions regarding the ruling on Ciaramitaro's claims. [Note 4] Saugus appealed separately from the dismissal of its third-party complaint and the two matters

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were consolidated by the Appeals Court. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

General Laws c. 76, Section 16, provides that a town or a regional school district will be liable in tort if it unlawfully excludes a student from the public schools. [Note 5] Since Ciaramitaro actually attended the Saugus public schools in the fall of 1982, he argues that the violation of G. L. c. 76, Section 16, lies in the fact that he was "excluded" from a vocational education by reason of Northeast's refusal to admit him coupled with Saugus's refusal to pay his tuition at Minuteman. Saugus contends that it is not liable under Section 16 because it provided Ciaramitaro with a public school education and that, beyond that, Ciaramitaro has no right to a vocational education. Moreover, Saugus contends that if there is liability, it lies with Northeast.

As the first reported question indicates, the quintessential issue in this case is whether Saugus was obligated to pay Ciaramitaro's transportation and tuition costs at Minuteman. If the town was so obligated, as the Superior Court judge ruled, then the town's failure to pay those costs would constitute an "exclusion" of Ciaramitaro within the meaning of G. L. c. 76, Section 16. In arguing that Saugus was required to pay his transportation and tuition costs, Ciaramitaro relies on G. L. c. 74, Sections 7, 8, and 8A. Section 7 provides that a student residing in a town which does not maintain a vocational

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school may be admitted to a vocational school in another town. [Note 6] Sections 8 and 8A provide that the student's town shall pay the tuition and transportation costs of a student who is admitted to a nonlocal vocational school pursuant to Section 7. [Note 7] Ciaramitaro argues that, because he was qualified

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for admission to vocational school, and because Northeast failed to admit him, Saugus does not "maintain" a vocational school within the meaning of G. L. c. 74, Section 7. We disagree.

The "words of a statute must be construed in association with other statutory language and the general statutory plan." Polaroid Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 393 Mass. 490, 497 (1984). It is incumbent on this court not to interpret the phrase "not maintaining approved . . . vocational . . . schools" in G. L. c. 74, Section 7, so as to render nonsensical other statutory enactments relating to the same subject. As the Appeals Court has noted, G. L. "c. 71 and c. 74 are `statutes relat[ing] to the same subject matter [which] should be construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose.'" Worcester Vocational Teachers Ass'n v. Worcester, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7 (1982), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513-514 (1975). The requirement in G. L. c. 74, Sections 7, 8, and 8A, that towns "not maintaining" vocational schools pay for resident students to attend other vocational schools must be read in light of the entire statutory scheme. General Laws c. 71, Section 15, and G. L. c. 74, Section 5A, authorize the formation of regional vocational school districts. The Northeast Metropolitan Regional Vocational School District is specifically authorized by St. 1962, c. 703, as amended. Once a regional vocational school district is formed, "the regional district school committee shall have the powers and perform the duties conferred by law upon local trustees for vocational-technical education." G. L. c. 74, Section 5A. Hence, when a town joins a regional vocational school district, the statute shifts the powers and duties relating to vocational education from the town to the regional district. In fact, G. L. c. 71, Section 14B (c), precludes member towns from offering vocational education programs by providing that "when a vocational school district is in operation, no member town of such district . . . shall . . . offer the same kinds of education as offered by said vocational school district."

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The member towns in this case entered into an agreement which mirrors the statutory requirements. Thus, when Saugus joined Northeast, all the powers and duties of Saugus relative to vocational education shifted to Northeast.

In light of this legislative scheme we think that the word "maintain" in G. L. c. 74, Section 7, must be deemed to include the statutorily permissible course of action chosen by Saugus; namely, participation in the Northeast Regional Vocational School District. It follows that, because Saugus did maintain a vocational school within the meaning of G. L. c. 74, Section 7, it was not required to pay Ciaramitaro's tuition and transportation costs at Minuteman. Accordingly, Saugus did not unlawfully exclude Ciaramitaro from the advantages and privileges of the public schools.

In view of our interpretation of the statutory scheme created by the Legislature, we do not need to answer the second and third reported questions. We note, however, that although the Legislature did not expressly provide an entitlement to vocational education in G. L. c. 74, Section 7, the legislative scheme may require the provision of free vocational education to qualified students. Since we have concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, Saugus cannot be held liable for failing to provide that education, that leaves the interesting problem, raised by the second reported question, whether Northeast can be held liable under G. L. c. 76, Section 16, for its refusal to admit Ciaramitaro. We do not decide this important question as it is not properly before us. However, on remand the judge may wish to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint to state a claim against Northeast.

We answer the first reported question, "No," and therefore we need not address the other two reported questions or the issue raised by Saugus in its separate appeal. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

So ordered.