Barthelene Wadja (petitioner) appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying her petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

The petitioner's son (defendant) has been charged in the District Court with assault and battery on a person over sixty years of age and with resisting arrest. The petitioner is the alleged victim. The defendant moved to suppress a recording made by a third party, allegedly in violation of the wiretapping statute, G. L. c. 272, § 99. The recording includes statements made by the defendant and the petitioner. The motion was denied. [Note 2] The petitioner sought relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, on the ground that the introduction of the recording into evidence in the defendant's trial would violate her privacy rights.

The matter is before us on a memorandum and appendix filed by the petitioner pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires her to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." It is clear that the denial of the motion to suppress can be reviewed on appeal, albeit not at the petitioner's behest, if the defendant is convicted of any offense. Nothing in G. L. c. 211, § 3, or rule 2:21 grants a nonparty to a criminal case, such as the petitioner here, standing to obtain review of an interlocutory order issued therein. Moreover, the Legislature has expressly provided a civil remedy, including compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees, for any aggrieved person whose oral or wire communications are unlawfully intercepted, disclosed, or used, or whose privacy is violated by means of an unauthorized interception. G. L. c. 272, § 99 Q. The petitioner does not address this remedy or explain why it would not be adequate to vindicate her privacy interests. In these circumstances, therefore, she has not carried her burden of establishing that she lacked an adequate remedy other than resort to this court's general superintendence power under G. L. c. 211, § 3.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

Jennifer H. O'Brien for the petitioner.

Elliot Saffran appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

Pursuant to G. L. c. 239, § 5 (f), Saffran sought review by an Appeals Court single justice of an order by a Housing Court judge requiring Saffran to make periodic payments to Novastar Mortgage, Inc., during the pendency of his appeal from an adverse judgment in an underlying summary process action. See G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e), fourth sentence. The Appeals Court single justice affirmed the decision. Saffran thereafter filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition seeking review of both the Appeals Court single justice's decision and the Housing Court judge's decision. A single justice of this court denied the petition.

Saffran has now filed what appears to have been intended as a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), but he is not challenging any interlocutory ruling of the trial court. Regardless of whether rule 2:21 applies, however, it is clear from the record that Saffran was not entitled to review pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, because he had an alternative remedy. See Matter of an Appeal Bond (No. 1), 428 Mass. 1013 (1998). The course for Saffran to have followed if he wished further to challenge the imposition or amount of the periodic payments was to refuse to make the payments, suffer the dismissal of his summary process appeal, and then appeal from the order of the dismissal to the Appeals Court (on the limited issue of the periodic payments). See id., and cases cited.

The single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

Elliot S. Saffran, pro se.