The petitioner, Christina Galarza, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying her petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

Pursuant to G. L. c. 239, § 5 (f), Galarza sought review by an Appeals Court single justice of an order of a Housing Court judge denying her motion to waive the appeal bond in connection with her appeal from an adverse judgment in an underlying summary process action. The Appeals Court single justice affirmed the judge's refusal to waive the appeal bond, and Galarza thereafter filed her G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition. A single justice of this court denied the petition, noting that Galarza had an adequate alternative remedy: she could have refused to pay the bond, suffered the dismissal of the summary process appeal, and then appealed from the order of dismissal to the Appeals Court on the bond issue. See Matter of an Appeal Bond (No. 1), 428 Mass. 1013 (1998).

Galarza has now filed what appears to have been intended as a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), even though she is not challenging an interlocutory ruling of the trial court. It is clear from what she has filed that she is not entitled to the relief she is currently seeking. According to Galarza, the appeal bond has since been paid through a "personal loan." She is currently asking us to review the denial of her motion to waive the bond anyway, so that she can immediately recoup the bond amount and repay the loan now instead of later. There is no right to have that kind of review. If Galarza is successful in her appeal in the underlying summary process action, the amount she has posted will be returned to her at that time. But having made the choice to post the bond, rather than exercise her right to refuse to post a bond and follow the procedure outlined in Matter of an Appeal Bond (No. 1), 428 Mass. at 1013, she is not entitled to return of the bond before prevailing on her appeal. One who is required to post a bond, who moves unsuccessfully in the trial court to have the bond waived, and who then unsuccessfully challenges the trial court's adverse ruling via the statutorily prescribed procedure (in this case, an appeal to a single justice of the Appeals Court, see G. L. c. 239, § 5 [f]), cannot pay the bond yet continue to litigate the matter as a matter of right in this court under G. L. c. 211, § 3.

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

Christina Galarza, pro se.

Chris C. Streeter appeals from a judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, her petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. In her petition, Streeter sought relief pertaining to several cases pending in the Probate and Family Court, specifically, an order that the Chief Justice of that court assign one or more judges to address outstanding issues in those cases. We need not belabor the details of the cases; it suffices to say that Streeter has filed numerous motions that remain outstanding. Her petition was apparently intended to spur action on her motions, not to challenge any particular interlocutory ruling. [Note 1] We affirm the judgment denying relief.

"Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 'is extraordinary and will be exercised only in the most exceptional circumstances.' . . . Accordingly, we review the single justice's decision for abuse of discretion or clear error of law." Perrier v. Commonwealth, 489 Mass. 28, 30 (2022), quoting Matthews v. Appeals Court, 444 Mass. 1007, 1008 (2005). Streeter has not established any abuse of discretion or error of law, as she has not shown any entitlement to the order that she seeks. The single justice was not obligated to intercede in the Probate and Family Court's management of the protracted litigation in which Streeter has been engaged, particularly where the record does not demonstrate that she has pursued all available measures to obtain action on her motions, such as bringing the delay to the attention of the Chief Justice of the Trial Court. See, e.g., Skandha v. Clerk of the Superior Court for Civil Business in Suffolk County, 472 Mass. 1017, 1018 (2015), citing Zatsky v. Zatsky, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 7, 12 (1994); Matthews v. D'Arcy, 425 Mass. 1021, 1022 (1997). "[N]o party . . . should expect this court to exercise its extraordinary power of general superintendence lightly." Randolph v. Commonwealth, 488 Mass. 1, 7 (2021), quoting Aroian v. Commonwealth, 483 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2019). Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, was properly denied. [Note 2]

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

Chris C. Streeter, pro se.