CARE AND PROTECTION OF JAYLEN. [Note 1]

WENDLANDT, J. This case lies at the intersection of two statutory schemes involving the Commonwealth's interest in the welfare of children and two departments of the Trial Court -- the Probate

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and Family Court and the Juvenile Court -- with overlapping jurisdiction. The first statutory scheme provides safeguards for the care and protection of children. See G. L. c. 119, §§ 24-26. If a Juvenile Court judge adjudicates a child in need of care and protection, the judge may award "permanent" custody to the child's parent "qualified to give care to the child." G. L. c. 119, § 26. Such an order of custody is subject to "review and redetermination" at the request of a party during the pendency of the care and protection proceeding at six-month intervals. Id. In the present case, after custody was removed from the mother of the nonmarital child, [Note 2] a Juvenile Court judge awarded "permanent" custody to the father. The child filed a motion to dismiss and to close the care and protection case, contending that the Juvenile Court's custody order, without an order from a judge of the Probate and Family Court, was sufficient to award permanent custody to the father. The Juvenile Court judge denied the child's motion in light of the second relevant statutory scheme, which comprehensively addresses the rights and responsibilities of the parents of nonmarital children and provides that the mother of a nonmarital child "shall" have custody "[i]n the absence of an order or judgment of a [P]robate and [F]amily [C]ourt [judge] relative to custody." G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (b).

The current practice in the Juvenile Court to resolve these seemingly imbricating schemes is to require the parent, who has been awarded permanent custody of the child in connection with a care and protection action, to seek an order of custody from the Probate and Family Court under the nonmarital child statutory scheme, G. L. c. 209C; the Juvenile Court judge will dismiss the care and protection proceeding only after a Probate and Family Court judge has issued an order regarding custody of the nonmarital child. We agree that this practice best reflects the Legislature's intent and harmonizes the two statutory schemes. Further concluding that, in the circumstances presented here, the practice complies with due process, we affirm the Juvenile Court judge's order denying the child's motion to dismiss the care and protection case in the present matter.

1. Background. The relevant facts are undisputed. In March 2021, following removal of the child from the mother, the

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Department of Children and Families (department) filed a care and protection petition in the Juvenile Court on behalf of the child pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24 (§ 24), alleging neglect by the mother. At that time, the mother, who never was married to the father, was the custodial parent of the child. The father established paternity when the child was born and was listed as the father on the child's birth certificate. [Note 3] The father did not, however, seek custody of the child prior to the filing of the care and protection petition. [Note 4]

Also in March 2021, the mother waived her right to a temporary custody hearing; a Juvenile Court judge approved the parents' written stipulation and granted temporary custody to the father, with conditions. The father has maintained custody of the child since then.

A different Juvenile Court judge (second judge) subsequently issued an order requesting that the Probate and Family Court resolve the issue of the child's custody and further ordered the father to file a complaint in the Probate and Family Court, which he did in August 2022. The father later filed a motion for temporary orders regarding the child's custody in the Probate and Family Court matter. [Note 5]

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In January 2023, the mother waived her right to a hearing on the merits of the care and protection proceedings; instead, she stipulated that she was unfit, that the child be adjudicated in need of care and protection, and that the father maintain permanent physical and legal custody of the child. The department, the father, and the child agreed. Following a colloquy with the mother, the second judge found the mother currently unfit and awarded permanent physical and legal custody to the father under G. L. c. 119, § 26 (§ 26), with the condition that, inter alia, the father abide by the parenting plan agreement executed by the parties. [Note 6] Per § 26 (c), the order of the second judge was subject to review and redetermination at six-month intervals. [Note 7]

In March 2023, the child filed a motion for permanent custody to be awarded to the father and for dismissal of the care and protection case. By then, the father had maintained custody of the child for over two years.

The second judge agreed with the undisputed position of the parties that the father presented no protective concerns, and that the father should be granted permanent legal and physical custody of the child. Nevertheless, the judge denied the child's motion, reasoning that an order from a Probate and Family Court judge was required in order for the father to retain permanent legal and physical custody of the child, despite the order she had issued pursuant to § 26, awarding "permanent" custody to the father as part of the care and protection proceedings. [Note 8] The child timely appealed, and we allowed his application for direct appellate review. [Note 9]

2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. This case presents a legal question as to the authority of a Juvenile Court judge under G. L. c. 119, § 26, regarding child custody matters, in light of the jurisdictional provisions of G. L. c. 209C, regarding custody of

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nonmarital children. Accordingly, our review is de novo. See Robinhood Fin. LLC v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 492 Mass. 696, 707 (2023) (questions of pure law reviewed de novo). See also Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. King, 485 Mass. 37, 41 (2020) (where "[t]he interpretive question[s] . . . [are] purely legal," we review them "de novo because [t]he duty of statutory interpretation rests ultimately with the courts" [citation omitted]).

The starting point of our analysis is the language of the relevant statutes, which constitutes "the principal source of insight into Legislative purpose." City Elec. Supply Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 481 Mass. 784, 788 (2019), quoting Simon v. State Examiners of Electricians, 395 Mass. 238, 242 (1985). "Clear and unambiguous statutory language is 'conclusive as to legislative intent.'" HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 332 (2022) (Morris), quoting Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 489 Mass. 356, 362 (2022). However, "[w]here the statutory language is not conclusive, we may turn to extrinsic sources, including the legislative history and other statutes, for assistance in our interpretation" (quotation and citation omitted). Morris, supra at 332-333.

We strive to construe a statute "in harmony with prior enactments to give rise to a consistent body of law" wherever possible, assuming as we must that the "Legislature was aware of the existing statutes" (citation omitted). Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 583 (1994). See School Comm. of Newton v Newton Sch. Custodians Ass'n, Local 454, SEIU, 438 Mass. 739, 751 (2003) ("In the absence of explicit legislative commands to the contrary, we construe statutes to harmonize and not to undercut each other"). Thus, "where two or more statutes relate to the same subject matter, they should be construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose." FMR Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 441 Mass. 810, 819 (2004), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513-514 (1975).

b. Statutory framework. We begin with a review of the statutory framework for care and protection proceedings, G. L. c. 119, §§ 24-26, as well as the Legislature's comprehensive scheme regarding the rights of nonmarital children, G. L. c. 209C.

i. Care and protection proceedings. Where a child "is not receiving adequate care and protection, the department may file a petition . . . to summons the child's parent 'to show cause why the child should not be committed to the custody of the department or

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why any other appropriate order should not be made.'" [Note 10] Care & Protection of Zeb, 489 Mass. 783, 785 (2022), quoting G. L. c. 119, § 24. [Note 11] The Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over such petitions. [Note 12] See G. L. c. 218, § 59 (setting forth Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over cases arising under G. L. c. 119).

If the child is adjudicated in need of care and protection, the judge may order the child committed to the department's custody. [Note 13] G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b). The judge also may "make any other appropriate order . . . about the care and custody of the child as may be in the child's best interest." Id. Relevant to the present action, the judge may "transfer temporary or permanent legal custody" of the child "to . . . any person, including the child's parent," who is "qualified to give care to the child." G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b) (2) (i). Absent "extraordinary circumstances that require continued intervention by the court, the [judge] shall enter a final order of adjudication and permanent disposition," no later than fifteen months after the care and protection petition was filed in the Juvenile Court. [Note 14] G. L. c. 119, § 26 (c).

ii. Nonmarital children. The comprehensive statutory scheme regarding nonmarital children governs three essential functions: paternity determinations, provision of child support, and custody and visitation matters. See G. L. c. 209C, § 1 (establishing "a means for such children either to be acknowledged by their parents voluntarily or, on complaint . . . , to have an

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acknowledgment or adjudication of their paternity, to have an order for their support and to have a declaration relative to their custody or visitation rights ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction").

Regarding the first two functions -- paternity and child support -- G. L. c. 209C provides for concurrent jurisdiction by the District Court, the Boston Municipal Court (BMC), and the Probate and Family Court. G. L. c. 209C, § 3 (a). [Note 15] Also with regard only to paternity and child support, the statute provides for concurrent jurisdiction by the Juvenile Court in limited circumstances and for limited duration. Specifically, a Juvenile Court judge, in connection with a care and protection proceeding brought under § 24, may issue orders regarding paternity and child support provided that the § 24 proceeding commenced prior to the G. L. c. 209C proceeding and that the two proceedings are joined or consolidated. G. L. c. 209C, § 3 (c). [Note 16]

With regard to custody, [Note 17] G. L. c. 209C states that the District Court and the BMC "shall have no jurisdiction" to determine custody of nonmarital children. [Note 18] G. L. c. 209C, § 3 (a). And, while the Legislature clearly was aware of and considered the pendency of a § 24 proceeding affecting a nonmarital child, including presumably the power of the Juvenile Court judge to

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award "permanent" custody of a nonmarital child to a parent "qualified to give care to the child," G. L. c. 119, § 26, the statutory scheme provides that, "[i]n the absence of an order or judgment of [the] [P]robate and [F]amily [C]ourt relative to custody, the mother shall continue to have custody of a child after an adjudication of paternity or voluntary acknowledgment of parentage" (emphasis added). [Note 19] G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (b). In addition, the statute directs that where a parent is unfit and "the other parent is fit to have custody, that parent shall be entitled to custody." [Note 20] G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (c).

c. Analysis. i. Statutory interpretation. The child maintains that the second judge's order awarding "permanent" custody of the child to the father under § 26 sufficed to effect a permanent custodial change from the mother to the father. The child relies on G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b), which permits a Juvenile Court judge to make "any other appropriate order . . . about the care and custody of the child as may be in the child's best interest." He also relies on G. L. c. 119, § 26 (c), which permits a Juvenile Court judge to enter a "final order of adjudication and permanent disposition" when "intervention by the court" is no longer needed. Together, the child contends, these provisions evince the legislative intent to permit a Juvenile Court judge to enter a permanent change in custody over nonmarital children.

As is evident from our review of the statutory schemes, the child's proposed construction of § 26 would render meaningless the provision of G. L. c. 209C directing that the mother of a nonmarital child "shall" have custody "[i]n the absence of an order or judgment of a [P]robate and [F]amily [C]ourt [judge]

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relative to custody." G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (b). [Note 21] Given this legislative directive that custody of a nonmarital child "shall" be with the mother absent an order of the Probate and Family Court, and the Legislature's express consideration of the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court over care and protection proceedings involving nonmarital children, see discussion supra, the scope of the authority of a judge of the Juvenile Court in care and protection proceedings to issue "permanent" custody to the parent of a nonmarital child must be more limited than advocated by the child. See DiMasi v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 491 Mass. 186, 197 (2023), quoting Collatos v. Boston Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 687 (1986) ("The 'statutory expression of one thing is an implied exclusion of other things omitted from the statute'").

The limited nature of the "permanent" custody order of the Juvenile Court is bolstered by the fact that any "permanent" custody order is subject to review and redetermination in view of the current needs of the child "not more than once every [six] months" at the request of, inter alia, the department, the child, or the parents. G. L. c. 119, § 26 (c). See Care & Protection of Thomasina, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 563, 570 (2009). At a review and redetermination proceeding, the Juvenile Court judge revisits the permanent custody order. See Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 571 (2005). "This provision is 'primarily, the means by which a parent or other interested party, including the department, may bring to a judge's attention a change in the situation of a child, or of a child's parent, which might warrant reconsideration or modification of the original order adjudicating the child in need of care and protection.'" Adoption of Helen, 429 Mass. 856, 861 (1999), quoting Care & Protection of Isaac, 419 Mass. 602, 611–612 (1995). [Note 22]

In the case of nonmarital children, whose custody under G. L.

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c. 209C, § 10 (b), "shall" remain with the mother until an order of the Probate and Family Court to the contrary, a Juvenile Court judge, as the second judge did here, may conclude that "intervention by the [Juvenile C]ourt" is needed until the father can have the custody issue determined by a Probate and Family Court judge. G. L. c. 119, § 26 (c). This reading harmonizes the Legislature's directive that custody of a nonmarital child "shall" be with the mother in the absence of an order of a Probate and Family Court judge, with the Juvenile Court's limited authority to issue orders awarding permanent custody to a parent "qualified to give care" in connection with the care and protection process. G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b) (2) (i). Therefore, the second judge properly concluded that keeping the care and protection proceeding open was in the best interest of the child, thereby allowing the father to secure custody in the forum provided by the Legislature for him to do so.

ii. Substantive due process. The child also contends that requiring the father, who has been found to be "qualified to give care" by the Juvenile Court judge, G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b) (2) (i), to obtain custodial orders in the Probate and Family Court infringes on the rights of fit parents to raise their children free from unwarranted State involvement and judicial scrutiny. To be sure, the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights protect the "fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 652-653 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003). Nonetheless, the Commonwealth has a compelling interest in the welfare of children. Blixt, supra at 656. See Matter of McCauley, 409 Mass. 134, 136 (1991). And the child rightly does not contend either that the care and protection proceedings delineated in G. L. c. 119, §§ 24-26, or that the statutory scheme targeted to protect the welfare of nonmarital children set forth in G. L. c. 209C, are not narrowly tailored to that interest such that either process violates the Federal or State Constitutions. See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 461 Mass. 232, 236 (2012) (to pass strict scrutiny, statutory scheme "[1] must be narrowly tailored to further a legitimate and compelling governmental interest and [2] must be the least restrictive means available to vindicate that interest" [citation omitted]).

Instead, the child's argument centers on the claim that the father must be excused from pursuing a custody determination in

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the Probate and Family Court –- a process that has been available to the father since the child's birth –- by virtue of the fact that the child, while under the mother's care, was the subject of a care and protection proceeding during which the father was found to be "qualified to give care to the child." G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b) (2) (i). In other words, the child asserts that the Legislature's decision to limit the authority of the Juvenile Court to issue custodial orders in connection with a care and protection proceeding involving a nonmarital child violates substantive due process.

Because there is no fundamental right to a particular forum, we apply a rational basis review. See Gillespie v. Northampton, 460 Mass. 148, 153 (2011) (statutes that do not "collide with a fundamental right" subject to rational basis standard of judicial review). Where a court reviews a law for rational basis, it owes the utmost deference to the Legislature. See Carleton v. Framingham, 418 Mass. 623, 631 (1994). "Under the rational basis standard, a statute is constitutionally sound if it is reasonably related to the furtherance of a valid State interest." Gillespie, supra, citing Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 330 (2003). A party raising such a challenge has "a heavy burden to meet" under this standard of review, and "we will recognize every rational presumption in favor of the legislation." Carleton, supra, citing American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass. 181, 190 (1978).

Here, the Commonwealth has an important interest in having custody matters involving nonmarital children finally determined in one forum: the Probate and Family Court. The Legislature has set forth specific, detailed guidelines for Probate and Family Court judges to follow. See discussion supra. Such centralization of custody rationally relates to the goal of producing consistent custodial decisions and facilitates the Legislature's goal of treating marital and nonmarital children equally. See G. L. c. 209C, § 1. Providing one forum for final determinations of child custody is well within the Legislature's purview. [Note 23] See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 312, 329 (2018), cert. denied,

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139 S. Ct. 794 (2019) (Legislature may designate jurisdiction over certain civil actions to one or more Trial Court departments).

We are not unsympathetic to the child's protest that the requirement of seeking a final determination regarding custody in the Probate and Family Court has resulted in some delay, during which time the care and protection case remains pending and there is at least the specter of continued State involvement. But the delay cannot be placed entirely at the feet of the busy court docket; a father, like the father in the present case, who has acknowledged paternity need not wait until the institution of a care and protection proceeding by the department to seek custody of the nonmarital child. See G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (b). Rather, that avenue has been available to the father since the child's birth. The fact that a nonmarital child may be the subject of a care and protection action in the Juvenile Court does not render unreasonable the Legislature's choice to solemnize custodial orders in a different forum. See Exxon Mobile Corp., 479 Mass. at 329. In fact, where, as here, the mother has been found to be unfit and the father is fit, the Legislature has directed the Probate and Family Court to award custody to the fit parent. See G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (c).

In any event, as a result of the process delineated in G. L. c. 119, §§ 24-26, the father has had legal custody of the child for years. The relief provided in § 26 for review and redetermination of the custody order in this case is theoretical only because none of the parties intends to seek such relief. Indeed, the department represents that it plans to close its case with the family in response to the child achieving permanency with the father. [Note 24] While the potential of State involvement is no doubt unsettling, nothing in the process set forth under G. L. c. 209C "shocks the conscience" (citation omitted). Murphy v. Commissioner of

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Correction, 493 Mass. 170, 176 (2023). [Note 25]

3. Conclusion. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the challenged order of the Juvenile Court denying the child's motion to dismiss.

So ordered.