IN THE MATTER OF A.Z.

CAMPBELL, J. This case involves an appeal by A.Z. of an order that she be hospitalized pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15(b) for observation and examination as her to competency to stand trial in her criminal case. She raises constitutional challenges that we address after setting forth the relevant prior proceedings and facts.

1. Prior proceedings. On July 9, 2018, A.Z. was arraigned in the Wrentham District Court for a single charge of threat of a bomb/hijack, in violation of G.L. c. 269, § 14(b). [Note 2] A.Z's. competency to stand trial was evaluated by Dr. Leah Robertson ("Robertson"). See G.L. c. 123, § 15(a). A.Z. was found to be competent and was not ordered to undergo further evaluation. See G.L. c. 123, § 15(b). The Commonwealth moved for A.Z.'s pretrial detention pursuant to the dangerousness statute, G.L. c. 276, § 58A. On July 17, 2018, the District Court entered a finding of dangerousness and ordered A.Z.'s detention.

A.Z. appealed the District Court's finding of dangerousness and its order of pretrial detention to the Superior Court. On August 3, 2018, the Superior Court affirmed the District Court's finding of dangerousness, but it determined there were conditions of release that could serve as an alternative to pretrial detention. The Superior Court ordered: GPS monitoring of A.Z.; that she reside at the Knights Inn in Hadley, Massachusetts or another location approved by probation; comply with a curfew 12:00 A.M. to 5:00 A.M.; stay away from the alleged victim or any employee of the Walpole Times; stay away from Walpole, Massachusetts; continue with mental health treatment under a doctor's supervision; take all prescribed medications; have no contact with the Walpole Times or any news organization; refrain from posting anything on social media; and sign and not rescind releases of information for probation.

On August 8, 2018, the Commonwealth moved to revoke A.Z.'s conditional release due to alleged violations of her conditions from A.Z.'s repeated contact with the Attorney General's Press Office. The Commonwealth's motion was denied, but A.Z.'s terms and conditions of release were amended. She was prohibited from having any contact with the Attorney General's Office. Further, she was restricted to using a phone or a computer only to facilitate contact with friends, family, counsel, therapists,

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and the housing authority.

On December 19, 2018, the Commonwealth again moved to revoke A.Z.'s conditional release for allegedly sending her children's book to the home of the Norfolk District Attorney and the parent's home of an assistant district attorney along with a note. Again, the Commonwealth's motion to revoke was denied. On December 28, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its denial of the motion for revocation due to the delivery of another copy of the book to the assistant district attorney at her office. That motion for reconsideration was not acted upon.

On January 4, 2019, the Commonwealth again moved to revoke A.Z.'s conditional release due to her friend sending a letter to the Walpole Times. The motion was denied.

On January 7, 2019, the Commonwealth again moved to revoke A.Z.'s conditional release because on January 3, 2019, she was arraigned on a new criminal charge of leaving the scene of an accident with property damage. The motion to revoke was denied. But, on that same day, the judge again ordered A.Z. to be evaluated for competency to stand trial pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15(a). [Note 3]

On January 10, 2019, A.Z. was examined at the court by the same court clinician who performed an evaluation of her competency to stand trial in July, 2018. [Note 4] After a full hearing, the judge ordered that A.Z. go to the Solomon Carter Fuller Mental Health Center for twenty days of observation and further examination.

On January 15, 2019, A.Z. filed a notice of appeal. [Note 5] On January 16, 2019, A.Z. filed a petition with the Supreme Judicial Court for relief pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, challenging the judge's order for further observation and examination pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15(b). On January 24, 2019, A.Z.'s petition was denied.

On January 29, 2019, after a hearing in the District Court, A.Z. was found incompetent to stand trial. The Commonwealth filed a motion requesting further observation and examination pursuant to G.L. c.123, § 16(a). That motion was allowed with neither party objecting. On March 1, 2019, after a hearing, A.Z. was found competent to stand trial.

On July 1, 2019, the court accepted a joint recommendation to place A.Z. on pretrial probation for three months with conditions. On October 1, 2019, A.Z.'s criminal case was dismissed.

2. G.L. c. 123, § 15(a) hearing conducted on January 10, 2019. Before the January 10, 2019, hearing began, counsel on behalf of A.Z. moved to continue the hearing to another date and for funds for an ongoing independent evaluation of A.Z.'s competency.

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Counsel wanted A.Z.'s evaluation to be performed on an outpatient basis. The judge allowed A.Z.'s motion for additional funds for her designated expert, Dr. Schmitz, but denied the request for a continuance of the hearing.

Dr. Robertson, a designated forensic psychologist working for the court clinic for about a year, performed the evaluation of A.Z. This was the second time Dr. Robertson evaluated A.Z. A.Z. and Dr. Robertson first met in July, 2018, after her arraignment. Dr. Robertson evaluated A.Z. for competency pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15(a). Dr. Robertson testified at the July 10, 2019, hearing as follows:

"At that time [July, 2018,] I realized that [A.Z.] is a very intelligent woman, had a very strong factual understanding of the proceedings against her, and had, in my opinion, a solid rational understanding of how she wanted to proceed. I did not recommend further evaluation at that time, and I believe she was found to be competent.

"Since then, I spoke with [A.Z.'s counsel] earlier this week [in January, 2019]. He shared with me that he is having this private evaluation done with Dr. Schmitz. I asked him how things had been going in these past six months with his client, and he indicated to me that he has noticed some decline, that she talks quite a bit, and it can get in the way of their discussing things.

"[A.Z.] told me when I first met her in July that she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. She had one psychiatric hospitalization at age 19. She's been seeing her current therapist, I believe, since 2013, and she is prescribed a mood-stabilizing medication since 2008. She said she is prescribed this medication to counterbalance the effect of an estrogen patch that she's taking.

"When I spoke to her today [January 10, 2019], it was very, very hard to interview her. She, in my opinion, had pressured speech, flight of ideas. I saw her attorney intervene multiple times to try to advise her. She ignored him, talked over him. It was very hard to even get through a few questions. Again, I'm not concerned about her factual understanding. It's more her rational understanding and her ability to communicate with her attorney.

"At the same time, this case has become quite complicated. Her attorney tells me that she's been arrested a couple of times for the possible violation of the conditions, which didn't turn out to be as such. He tells me that she has an open charge for leaving the scene in a car accident recently.

"Today, she tells me that she does not believe that she has a mental illness, which my understanding is that she would no[t] pursue further mental health treatment if she does not believe she has a mental illness. She does tell me that she feels anguished about this relationship with this other man, Kevin, as well as all the stress of these court proceedings, and there's a lot of evidence. It seems like it's been quite a complicated case. So

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in my opinion, the bar is higher for her to be competent, to manage all this complex information.

"So at the present time, I do not think she possesses the ability to consult with her attorney in a rational manner in her own best interest. So I would recommend further evaluation. And my recommendation would be . . . a psychiatric hospital. I think if she does not treat this mental illness, she will continue to decompensate.

"No history of suicide attempts, violence. She denied current thoughts to harm herself or anyone else. There is no overt psychotic symptoms like hearing voices or gross bizarre delusional beliefs. But I do believe that her presentations today are a result of mental illness, and that she does require a psychiatric hospitalization."

In arguing against an inpatient evaluation of A.Z.'s competency, the following relevant colloquy occurred between the judge and A.Z.'s attorney:

"Counsel for A.Z.: What you haven't heard today is any argument by the court clinic, or by the Commonwealth, or by anyone who has -- who knows -- who has information about [A.Z.] or the case that she's a danger to herself or others. In fact, if the --

"Judge: Is that the test, Counsel?

"Counsel for A.Z.: No, but that's -- under Section 12, that would be the standard for whether or not she would need to be hospitalized. And so it has to be a consideration here. As you -- as I put in my affidavit in support of my motion for funds, there is no reason to believe that she's a danger to herself or others. Dr. Schmitz did not believe she was a danger to herself or others on Monday. Nobody today believes she's a danger to herself or others.

"Judge: All right. I understand.

"Counsel for A.Z.: And there are other alternatives to -- I mean, I think that's the most important thing here. There is an alternative to her hospitalization, and nothing has been put forward today on why she needs to be hospitalized.

"Judge: Well, respectfully, there was an argument. The presentation included, among other things, that she doesn't believe that she has a mental problem that needs to be addressed, and therefore Dr. Robertson was concerned that she may not be a good candidate for voluntary treatment.

"Counsel for A.Z.: But there was also testimony that she's seeing her therapist, that she's taking her medications.

"Judge: Ok. I'm sorry. Let me just interrupt. Doctor, did you have a suggestion

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as to what facility should I order her to go to --

"Dr. Robertson: Solomon Carter Fuller Mental Health Center.

...

"Counsel for A.Z.: So in other words -- and I've also -- included in my affidavit is a belief by myself, as well as the mental health clinician that I've hired in the case, who has already begun a competency evaluation, that it could be done on an outpatient basis. [Note 6] And why shouldn't the Court always err on the side of not committing someone? They're -- and that's why I said she's not a danger to herself or others. Shouldn't that be a standard here, that we should commit people against their will for 20 days if, and only if, they're a danger to themselves or others? There is another way for this evaluation to take place, and that's why I brought up -- this -- that's why it's all relevant.

"The Commonwealth was the one who suggested it. That was based in part on things that she didn't do. Now there's no reason -- she appeared here for the evaluation. She appeared Monday . . . for the motion to revoke. The motion to revoke was denied. She met with my doctor on Monday. She was released Friday from -- after the warrant was lifted. She appeared Monday. . . .

"Judge: I understand this part, yeah. . . . [Y]ou've told me that already, so. Any other argument?

"Counsel for A.Z.: No, I just -- I think it's unfair. I think it's a violation of her due process rights for her to be hospitalized. This -- she has a threats case where she is working with me towards trial. There is a question of competency that can be resolved on an outpatient basis before we determine whether or not she can proceed to trial.

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"Did -- I mean, her car is outside. She lives in Western Massachusetts. She has a life. She -- if you detain her now for 20 days, that will be disruptive. She met with her therapist on, what, last week, Thursday, which she does every week. She's -- there's -- she takes medications.

"So the standard should not be because she says she doesn't have mental illness that she needs to be hospitalized to determine her competency. That's not -- that's not logical. One doesn't follow from the other. The question is does she understand . . . the proceedings against her and can she work with her attorney, and that can be determined by a doctor on an outpatient basis. If a doctor decides that she can't -- by observation, that she can't work with me because her mental illness is getting in the way, then that can be determined on outpatient basis. There's -- there hasn't been anything today presented to you why this -- why inpatient is necessary. And so the Court should always err on the side of outpatient.

"Judge: Thanks so much.

. . .

"Judge: All right. Ms. [Z] can you come up here, please?

"Let me say that I understand that you would rather not me order you to be further evaluated by the state under Chapter 15(a) and the subsequent chapters under 123. However, I do understand Dr. Leah Robertson's presentation as her observations, her thoughts concerning the challenges that you're presented with and the way in which she observed your behavior and characteristics today and prior. I understand that she does believe that you have this illness, and that you are not in a position to be able to confidently assist counsel, and therefore she is recommending further evaluation and a work-up under the General Law, Chapter 120 [sic], Section 15(a) and (b). I am going to allow that and endorse her suggestion that you be committed to the Solomon Carter Fuller Mental Health Institution for further -- Center for further evaluation under the chapter and section."

3. Issues raised by A.Z. are not moot. After review by a clinician and a full hearing conducted pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15(a), A.Z. was ordered to undergo further observation and examination as to her competency to stand trial, pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15(b), at the Solomon Carter Fuller Mental Health Center. The Commonwealth challenges this Appellate Division's review of the issues raised by A.Z., urging that we find the matter to be moot. That assertion must fail. In Matter of F.C., 479 Mass. 1029 (2018), the Supreme Judicial Court held that "[a]ppeals from expired or terminated commitment and treatment orders under G.L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8 and 8B, like appeals from expired harassment prevention orders (G.L. c. 258E) or expired abuse prevention orders (G.L. c. 209A), 'should not be dismissed as moot where the parties have a continuing interest in the case.' See Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 62 [(2014)]. At the very least, a person who has been wrongfully committed or treated

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involuntarily has 'a surviving interest in establishing that the orders were not lawfully issued, thereby, to a limited extent, removing a stigma from his name and record.' Id., quoting Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998) (abuse prevention order). Although an expired or terminated order may no longer have operative effect, the appeal should not be dismissed without considering the merits of the underlying order. See Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 276 (1978) ('[m]ental illness does not carry the same stigma it once did, but we are not prepared to say the stigma has entirely disappeared')." Matter of F.C., supra at 1029-1030. See also Garcia v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 97, 102 (2021) (temporary commitment order pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 16(a), like other civil commitments, carries stigma providing defendant surviving interest).

Even if the court's order that A.Z. undergo further observation and examination pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15(b) was moot, we would review the issues raised by A.Z. She raises constitutional due process and equal protection challenges, issues that are capable of repetition yet evading review. Her challenge is not a challenge merely to the order of observation and examination. "'Issues involving the commitment and treatment of mentally ill persons are generally considered matters of public importance,' and that such issues, even where moot, 'present "classic examples" of issues that are capable of repetition, yet evading review.' Matter of N.L., 476 Mass. 632, 635 [(2017)], quoting Newton Wellesley Hosp. v. Magrini, 451 Mass. 777, 782 (2007)." Matter of F.C., supra at 1029 n.1. Contrast this case with Matter of A.H., 2018 Mass. App. Div. 13. [Note 7] As such, the issues raised by A.Z. will be addressed by this Appellate Division.

4. Sections 15(a) & (b): Constitutional and statutory interpretation. On January 10, 2019, at the Wrentham District Court, A.Z. met with Dr. Robertson, a designated forensic psychologist. Dr. Robertson conducted an evaluation of A.Z. pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15(a). Previously, in July, 2018, after A.Z. was arraigned, she did a similar evaluation. At that time, she found A.Z. had a very strong factual understanding of the proceedings and a solid rational understanding of how she wished to proceed with her criminal case. But this time, the result of Dr. Robertson's examination was different.

Dr. Robertson reported that it was very hard to interview A.Z. Her speech was pressured, and she had a "flight of ideas." She ignored her attorney and his advice, speaking over him and making it hard to get responses to even a few questions. The doctor had concerns about A.Z.'s rational understanding and ability to communicate with counsel.

Even though A.Z. has a history of bipolar and takes medication, A.Z. told the doctor

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she did not believe that she was suffering from a mental illness, making it questionable whether she would pursue mental health treatment. A.Z. was anguished about her relationship with a man and was stressed about the court proceedings and evidence. Dr. Robertson found A.Z. did not possess the ability to consult with her attorney in a rational manner in her own best interest. She recommended commitment to the Solomon Carter Fuller Mental Health Center.

A.Z.'s attorney argued that there was no evidence A.Z. presented a danger to herself or others. [Note 8] Further, A.Z. was proceeding with a competency evaluation on an outpatient basis, which was a less restrictive means of conducting the evaluation. He opined that A.Z.'s due process rights were being violated as there was no reason to order an inpatient evaluation taking away her liberty.

The judge pointed out to A.Z.'s attorney that the standard he was espousing, a danger to self or others, was not required by G.L. c. 123, § 15(b) for a twenty-day order of hospitalization for observation and examination of competency.

A. Constitutional. Both federal and state constitutional law prohibit the trial, conviction, or sentencing of an incompetent person. "'It has long been the law of this Commonwealth that the "trial, conviction or sentencing of a person charged with a criminal offence while he is legally incompetent violates his constitutional rights of due process" . . ., whether under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or under art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of this Commonwealth.' Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 51-52 (1978), quoting from Commonwealth v. Vailes, 360 Mass. 522, 524 (1971)." Commonwealth v. Adkinson, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 570, 583 (2011). "To be competent to stand trial, a defendant must have 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and [have] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). See Commonwealth v. Vailes, 360 Mass. 522, 524 (1971)." Commonwealth v. Haltiwanger, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 543, 556 n.11 (2021). See also Commonwealth v. Adkinson, supra at 583-584.

"When a criminal defendant is suspected of being incompetent to stand trial, a court may order the defendant to be evaluated by a court-appointed medical professional for an initial determination of competency. See G.L. c. 123, § 15(a). If the initial determination is that the defendant appears to be incompetent and further examination is necessary, a judge may order the defendant committed to a mental health facility for a period of observation not to exceed twenty days. See G.L. c. 123, § 15(b)." Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 116-117 (2018).

Section 15 of G.L. c. 123 states in relevant part:

"(a) Whenever a court of competent jurisdiction doubts whether a defendant in a criminal case is competent to stand trial or is criminally responsible by reason of mental illness or mental defect, it may at any stage of the proceedings after the return of an indictment or the issuance of a criminal complaint against the defendant, order an examination of such defendant to be conducted by one or more qualified psychologists. Whenever practicable,

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examinations shall be conducted at the court house or place of detention where the person is being held. When an examination is ordered, the court shall instruct the examining physician or psychologist in the law for determining mental competence to stand trial and criminal responsibility.

"(b) After the examination described in paragraph (a), the court may order that the person be hospitalized at a facility or, if such person is a male and appears to require strict security, at the Bridgewater state hospital, for a period not to exceed twenty days for observation and further examination, if the court has reason to believe that such observation and further examination are necessary in order to determine whether mental illness or mental defect have so affected a person that he is not competent to stand trial or not criminally responsible for the crime or crimes with which he has been charged. Copies of the complaints or indictments and the physician's or psychologist's report under paragraph (a) shall be delivered to the facility or said hospital with the person."

Because bringing to trial, convicting, or sentencing a legally incompetent defendant violates their constitutional substantive due process rights, temporary detention, such as that permitted by G.L. c. 123, § 15(b), when there is a question of competency, satisfies a compelling government interest of ensuring incompetent people are not criminally tried, convicted, or sentenced. Cf. Garcia v. Commonwealth, supra at 103. [Note 9]

Recently commenting on G.L. c. 123, § 15 and explaining the distinction between cases where there is a criminal charge pending and where a mental health commitment is strictly civil, the Supreme Judicial Court stated the following:

"Nothing in our holding today is intended to affect the statutory scheme in G.L. c. 123, § 15. Under that section, a judge may order an evaluation of a defendant by a court clinician before trial if the judge doubts whether the defendant is competent to stand trial or criminally responsible by reason of

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mental illness (§ 15[a] evaluation). That examination is typically brief and takes place in the court house or in a place where the defendant is being detained before trial. There is no separate and independent detention of the defendant for that purpose. After the § 15(a) evaluation, the judge may then order that the person be involuntarily hospitalized for up to twenty days, for observation and a more detailed examination, if, based on the court clinician's evaluation, the court 'has reason to believe that such observation and further examination are necessary in order to determine whether mental illness or mental defect have so affected a person that he is not competent to stand trial or criminally responsible.' G.L. c. 123, § 15(b).

"Hospitalization under § 15(b) is distinguishable from that under § 16(a) for two reasons. First, it is narrowly tailored. By the time a hospitalization is ordered under § 15(b), there already has been an initial evaluation under § 15(a) and a determination based on it that the hospitalization is needed. Thus, only defendants for whom a longer period of observation and examination is needed will be hospitalized against their will. Second, there is a compelling government interest. Because the criminal case is ongoing, an evaluation under § 15 to determine the defendant's competency or lack of criminal responsibility is designed to help ensure that a defendant is not tried while incompetent or found guilty when he or she lacks criminal responsibility. See Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 152 (2007) (subjecting incompetent defendant to trial would violate due process rights)."

Garcia v. Commonwealth, supra at 106 n.15. See also Commonwealth v. Calvaire, 476 Mass. 242, 246 (2017) (confinement of incompetent defendants under G.L. c. 123, § 16[f] "narrowly tailored to allow the Commonwealth some time to pursue the legitimate and proper purpose of prosecuting charged crimes, but not for a period of time longer than is reasonably necessary to ascertain the defendant's chances of regaining competency"), cited with approval in Garcia v. Commonwealth, supra at 102 n.10.

It is clear that when criminal charges are pending, the court's desire to make certain that an incompetent person is not forced to go to trial provides a compelling state interest. As such, it is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.

Counsel on behalf of A.Z. argues that her equal protection rights protected by the United States Constitution and art. 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights were violated. She opines that people with mental illness may not be treated differently under G.L. c. 123 absent proof of dangerous and no available less restrictive alternative. As set forth in Commonwealth v. Calvaire, 476 Mass. 242 (2017), such an equal protection claim to a provision of G.L. c. 123 that involves not only mental illness but a pending criminal charge fails. Id. at 245-247 (equal protection argument challenging G.L. c. 123, § 16(f) fails; competent and incompetent defendants are not similarly situated; statute does not improperly intrude on liberty interest where it is narrowly tailored to compelling state interest).

Additionally, the issue of a less restrictive alternative to hospitalization was not properly before the court. On January 7, 2019, the court put the parties on notice that A.Z.'s competency was an issue. It approved funds for an independent evaluation by A.Z.'s expert, Dr. Schmitz. The court continued the G.L. c. 123, § 15(a) hearing on

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competency until January 10, 2019. Yet on January 10, 2019, neither Dr. Schmitz nor a sworn affidavit from Dr. Schmitz was presented to the court for consideration.

Instead, A.Z.'s counsel in a motion requesting additional funds for Dr. Schmitz and a continuance asserted in relevant part: "Dr. Schmitz told me that [A.Z.] did not meet the legal and clinical criteria for commitment (danger to self or others) on 1/7/19. Dr. Schmitz told me that she believes that she could complete a 123/15 evaluation on an outpatient basis." Clearly, these statements of the clinician were offered by counsel for the truth of the matter asserted and are hearsay that the judge could not consider. See Mass. G. Evid. §§ 801-802, at 281-301 (2021). Therefore, there was no credible evidence on this issue of a less restrictive alternative to hospitalization before the court.

B. Statutory interpretation. A.Z.'s argument that G.L. c. 123, § 15(b) violates her rights is misplaced for additional reasons. She argues involuntary hospitalization for an evaluation and examination of competency without a finding of danger to self or others and without consideration of less restrictive alternatives goes against the legal tenets of G.L. c. 123. She does this by comparing G.L. c. 123, § 15(b) to G.L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, 12, and 35. But she overlooks very important distinctions between these sections.

First, G.L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, 12, and 35 deal with involuntary civil commitments. A finding of serious risk of harm to self or others is specifically required by the plain language appearing in those statutory sections. In contrast, A.Z. was facing a criminal charge when issues of her competency arose. See G.L. c. 123, § 15(b). In her criminal case, she already was found by both the District Court and the Superior Court to be a danger pursuant to the dangerousness statute, G.L. c. 276, § 58A.

The judge's January 10, 2019, order of hospitalization for observation and examination for competency was directly related to her pending criminal charge. This was not a civil commitment. Further, G.L. c. 123, § 15(b) does not in its language require a finding of serious risk of harm to self or others for a temporary hospitalization for observation and to evaluate competency. If after the initial period of hospital observation and examination a person is found incompetent, for a judge to order a long- term hospitalization, he must make a finding of serious risk of harm to self or others in sync with the standard required for an involuntary civil commitment. See G.L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. See also G.L. c. 123, § 16.

Turning again to A.Z.'s argument espousing that a judge should be required to find a defendant poses a danger to order a twenty-day hospitalization for observation and examination of competency, the plain language of G.L. c. 123, §§ 15(a) and (b) does not set forth such a requirement. The Supreme Judicial Court recently offered guidance as to a court's interpretation of statutory language enacted by the Legislature. In several opinions -- Garcia v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 97, 107 (2021), Rahim v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 486 Mass. 544, 547 (2020), and Commonwealth v. Montarvo, 486 Mass. 535, 536-537 (2020) -- the Court held that statutory interpretation should give meaning to the plain language of the words set forth in a statute and should not read into a statute a meaning not intended by its enactment.

Sections 15 and 16 of G.L. c. 123 both address the hospitalization of defendants for observation and examination of competency. Section 16(a) specifically requires that for a longer-term hospitalization for competency, a judge must make a finding of serious risk of harm to self or others. In contrast, that language is absent from G.L. c. 123, § 15(a) and (b), which addresses temporary initial hospitalizations of twenty days or so. It is not appropriate for this Appellate Division to read into G.L. c. 123, § 15(a) and

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(b) a standard that the Legislature chose not to impose. See Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 683- 684 (1993). See also Garcia v. Commonwealth, supra at 106-107 ("We doubt whether our tools of statutory interpretation would allow us [to read into G.L. c. 123, § 16(a) a standard found in other portions of the statute], . . . especially where legislative history suggests the legislature might not have intended to include a standard at all.").

For all the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.